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DISCRIMINATION WITH A DIFFERENCE: CAN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
ACCOMMODATE THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT?
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF* & JUSTIN NELSON**
This Article explains that all employment discrimination laws not
only condemn the subjugation of defined groups, they also impose
significant redistributive costs. The Article uses the Americans
with Disabilities Act as an example to examine how much
redistribution is proper under the rubric of nondiscrimination.
The most recent ADA cases, most notably Sutton v. United Air
Lines, reveal more starkly than prior employment discrimination
case law the tension between the nondiscrimination command and
the redistributive side of employment opportunity law. The
doctrinal difficulties faced by courts interpreting the ADA stem
directly from the inability of the anti-discrimination model to
control or focus the fundamentally redistributivist command of the
ADA. This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's confrontation
with the open-ended statutory terms of "major life activity" and
''reasonable accommodation'" and analyzes the most recent ADA
employment decisions as an attempt to create a limited and
responsible regulatory framework out of the statute. This Article
then considers what tools courts need to fulfill this regulatory
function and asks whether courts are the proper institutional
actors to carry out this task.
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INTRODUCTION
All employment discrimination laws carry forth a dual objective.
These laws embody both a straightforward anti-discrimination
command and a redistributive norm. At their simplest, such laws
condemn the subjugation of defined groups of people for a variety of
reasons-prejudice,' fear,2  unconscious motivations, 3  cognitive
distortions,4 and assumed characteristics. 5 They even go so far as to
prohibit capitulation to such biases among coworkers, customers, or
the public at large.6 The anti-subjugation principle has a long history
in American equal protection law, 7 and is a principle that through the
1. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Anti-
discrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) ("Anti-discrimination law seeks to
neutralize widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based
upon inaccurate judgments about their worth or capacities.").
2. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (condemning a local zoning ordinance for discriminating against the
mentally retarded on the basis of "irrational fears").
3. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1987) (arguing that a large
portion of behavior that produces discrimination stems from unconscious motivations).
4. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1164-65 (1995).
5. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding that race-based preemptory
challenges violate equal protection law because they perpetuate "the very stereotype the
law condemns").
6. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074-78 (1995)
(asserting that the desire to obtain greater status fuels inter-group discrimination).
7. A notable example is Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879), which
struck down a provision that prohibited blacks from serving on juries. The Reconstruction
Amendments had addressed equal protection for what were deemed "civil rights" through
the Fourteenth Amendment and "political rights" through the right to vote guaranteed
under the Fifteenth Amendment. This left the right to serve as a juror, the other
recognized political right of the nineteenth century, uniquely outside constitutional
protection. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court read into the Fourteenth Amendment a far-
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Commerce Clause8 may sweep into the functioning of private
markets.9
But employment discrimination laws are not merely exhortations
against the wrongs occasioned by retrograde views. All employment
discrimination laws are, at least implicitly, deeply redistributive.
These laws seek to alter the outcomes of how employees are selected
and how their services are valued in the private market.10 There
would be no compelling reason for the sweeping intrusion into the
realm of privately-revealed preferences in market decisions of whom
to hire and whom to promote, and how much to pay the employees
selected, unless there were a corresponding belief that the revealed
market preferences are in some deep sense wrong. As expressed by
Professor Jolls, these laws do not "reflect an ideal of forcing only
'economic rationality' out of employers."" Put most fundamentally,
one cannot read Title VIF or its legislative history simply as a
statement that hostility to blacks in the workplace is opprobrious.
13
reaching prohibition on the subjugation of the former slaves that would address all forms
of formal exclusion from public institutions, including jury service. Id at 305-08.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
9. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he
commerce power is broad enough to support federal legislation regulating the terms and
conditions of state employment and, therefore, provides the necessary support for the
1972 Amendments to Title VII."); id at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Congressional
authority to enact the provisions of Title VII at issue in this case is found in the Commerce
Clause."); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-62 (1964)
(citing legislative history to find the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a valid exercise of Commerce
Clause powers).
10. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1628 (1991) ("It is
commonly said that the purpose of employment discrimination laws is to redistribute
income and wealth in favor of African Americans."); cf Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715,730 (1994)
("The ADA... operates as a redistribution of wealth from consumers to disabled persons
who take advantage of the ADA's protections.").
11. Christine JoUs, Accommodation Mandates and Anti-discrimination Law, 53 STAN.
L. REV. (forthcoming November 2000) (manuscript at 73, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
13. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998);
see also 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (noting that Title VII's focus was on opening employment
opportunities for blacks in occupations traditionally closed to them, in part to combat "the
plight of the Negro in our economy"); George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice,
78 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1465 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)) (noting
that employment discrimination laws were "designed to open jobs to groups excluded
from them"). This pattern is repeated with regard to every major employment
discrimination statute. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
309
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Rather, the point of the statute is to combat the consequences of the
lack of employment opportunity for blacks. First and foremost
among these consequences is the denial of jobs, promotions, and
income as a result of invidious discrimination.
What then is the relation between the two objectives of
employment discrimination law? Or, put another way, how much
redistribution is proper under the rubric of nondiscrimination? The
core of this Article will be an exploration of this question with regard
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the "Act"), 14
particularly in light of the troubling decisions of the Supreme Court
during the 1998-1999 term in the ADA accommodation trilogy,
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 5 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,16
and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.7 In each of these cases, the
Court confronted a claim that an employer's unwillingness or inability
to provide employment opportunity for disabled workers amounted
to forbidden discrimination. Discrimination in this context is
established by the ADA's prohibition that no covered employer
"shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability" 8 if
such an individual, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires." 9
Our argument is that because of the inherent uncertainty in the
obligation to provide "reasonable accommodation," the ADA trilogy
reveals more starkly than prior employment discrimination case law
the tension between the nondiscrimination command and the
redistributive side of employment opportunity law. The Title VII
cases required neither an independent normative justification for
their redistributive impact nor an independent measure of how much
redistribution was appropriate. The redistribution in early
discrimination case law flowed directly from the prohibition on
discrimination simpliciter and the measure of required redistribution
followed tort-based principles of making whole the victims of that
§ 621(b) (1994) (noting that the congressional purpose is to "promote employment of
older persons").
14. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) and in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
15. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
16. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
17. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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discrimination.2 ° In the ADA context, by contrast, the overwhelming
sweep of cases concern not discrimination simpliciter,21 but a claimed
failure to redistribute in the form of accommodation.' The ADA
cases, therefore, require an independent normative command for the
obligation to redistribute or accommodate and some measure of how
much redistribution should ensue.
The key to our argument is that courts lack the tools to make
these sorts of determinations and that prior employment
discrimination law does not provide assistance. Our goal in this
Article is not to propose an optimal regulatory framework for the
problems facing the disabled in the workplace. Rather, we propose to
examine the doctrinal difficulties that courts, most notably the
Supreme Court, have faced when defining the scope of employer
liability under the ADA. Our thesis is that the doctrinal difficulties
faced by courts result from the inability of the anti-discrimination
model to direct the fundamentally redistributivist command of the
ADA.
Our objective is to explore the tension between the use of the
anti-discrimination model and the ADA's marked departure from
prior employment law. Our discussion will proceed in three parts.
20. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975) (stating that the
purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination and make whole the victims of such
discrimination); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (holding that the purpose of
a constitutional remedy is to "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct").
21. As expressed by Professors Karlan and Rutherglen:
[The ADA uses] a far different definition of "discrimination" than the definition
embraced in other areas of employment discrimination law. Title VII, for
instance, essentially takes jobs as it finds them. It defines discrimination in a
negative sense: employment practices are unlawful only if they prevent
individuals from doing the job as the employer defines it. The failure to
undertake positive steps to revamp the job or the environment does not
constitute discrimination.
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (1996).
22. See John M. Vande Walle, In the Eye of the Beholder: Issues of Distributive and
Corrective Justice in the ADA's Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as Disabled,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 925 (1998) (arguing that in ADA cases, unlike other
discrimination cases, "[r]edistribution is required because of the employee's status, not
because the employer has committed a moral wrong"); Willis, supra note 10, at 730
("[T]he ADA operates as a tool which redistributes wealth from consumers and the labor
force as a whole to the disabled persons who choose to invoke it."); MARK KELMAN,
MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND GROUPS 6-7 (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 8, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (arguing "that the accommodation norm establishes a distributive claim ...
rather than a right"); see also infra pp. 338-39 (questioning whether the ADA truly
belongs within an anti-discrimination rubric).
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First, we will trace the central conceptual difficulty of the application
of the anti-discrimination model to a standard of reasonable
accommodation. We will then draw the connections between this
central conceptual difficulty and the ADA's regulatory structure. 2
Second, we will examine the issues posed in the 1998-1999 term's
ADA employment trilogy in light of this fundamental tension.2 4 We
will analyze the divisions within the Court in its effort to cabin the
open-ended quality of the ADA's accommodation standard through
one or another of the Act's magic phrases-"disability," "major life
activity," or "reasonable accommodation." We will then recast the
divisions on the Court as a disagreement on how to create a
responsible regulatory framework out of vague legislation and how
the Court's focus on the "major life activity" prong of the statute fits
into the attempt to mold a workable regulatory structure. Finally, we
will consider what tools courts need to fulfill this regulatory function
and further ask whether courts are the proper institutional actors to
carry out this task.z
I. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND DISCRIMINATION
The choice of the anti-discrimination model for the ADA was
certainly not an oversight. The Act proclaims its primary purpose as
being "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 26
The statute begins simply enough by invoking the standard anti-
discrimination formula to prevent an employer from "discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."'27 This language is accompanied by florid claims in the
legislative history drawing an unbroken line from the Civil Rights Act
of 196428 to the ADA.2 9  Unlike other major employment
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. 1447 and scattered in 42 U.S.C.).
29. Senator Ted Kennedy proclaimed:
In the 1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke of a time when people would be
judged by the content of their character and not the color of their skin. The
312 [Vol. 79
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discrimination statutes, however, the ADA runs into immediate
difficulty in identifying the protected class.3
Title VII presents a paradigmatic model of the relation of the
anti-subjugation command to anticipated redistribution. In its
original application, Title VII addressed forcible occupational
segregation by race such that black employees were held to the lowest
paying and most unattractive jobs. The presumption was that, but for
discrimination, black employees, just as their white counterparts,
would prefer to work as over-the-road truck drivers instead of local
delivery drivers or would prefer to move into skilled trades in the
steel industry rather than serve in the dirty and dangerous position of
coal shovelers.31  Title VII's removal of the discriminatory barriers
proved this assumption absolutely correct; black employees did
indeed move into the more desirable positions.3  The perfectly
Americans with Disabilities Act ensures that millions of men, women, and
children can look forward to a day when they will be judged by the strength of
their abilities and not misconceptions about their disabilities.... But this
journey has not been easy or quick. It was only in the past 2 years, as the Nation
approached the 25th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-that it became
clear that the time has finally come to address the unfinished business of civil
rights for those with disabilities.
136 CONG. REC. 17,360-61 (1990). Similarly, Senator Robert Dole announced:
[L]ast month, we celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The passage of the Civil Rights Act was one of Congress'-and America's-
shining moments. And it was one of the great milestones in America's long
journey toward civil rights justice. So I am pleased today to join with President
Bush in endorsing the Americans With Disabilities Act-the next major step in
the civil rights struggle-and a bill that will finally expand civil rights protections
for people with disabilities.
136 CONG. REc. 18,879 (1990).
30. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 38-39 (2000). For example, Title VII clearly defines its
protected class by prohibiting employers from discriminating "because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Additionally, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
defines the protected class by stating "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); cf infra note 44 and accompanying text
(discussing the definition of the ADA's protected class).
31. See, e.g., Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348-49 (1977)
(holding that a promotion system effectively "freezing" minority workers into undesirable
positions by maintaining the status quo violated Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating the purpose of Title VII was "to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantages of minority citizens"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.").
32. See, e.g., Int'l Bd of Teamsters., 431 U.S. at 337 (holding that the systematic failure
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predictable consequence was a corresponding redistribution of
income and opportunity.33 Indeed, the smooth interrelation between
the anti-subjugation command and the ensuing redistribution may
explain the unparalleled success of Title VII in its immediate post-
enactment period. 4
The key to these early Title VII cases was the ease of the
syllogism that, but for the improper discrimination, blacks and whites
would be similarly situated and would obtain an equitable
distribution of social opportunities. The simplicity of that syllogism
breaks down as the anti-discrimination norm becomes more
venturesome and attempts to subsume differences that are not merely
the product of societal construction, but that draw substantially from
different sets of employees who are differently situated, as with
distinctions according to pregnancy or age.35 What is unique about
the ADA is precisely that it is the first employment discrimination
law that does not attempt, even as a formal matter, to derive its
redistributive objective from the anti-subjugation command. Rather,
the concept of discrimination is defined in terms of the failure to
redistribute initially.36 Put another way, the core of the anti-
to hire, transfer, or promote black members to higher paying, more desirable positions
violated Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (granting
back pay to a victim of discrimination pursuant to Title VII's purposes of eradicating
discrimination and making victims whole); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (holding
unconstitutional an aptitude test that effectively rendered blacks unable to advance
beyond the company's lowest paying department).
33. See John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic
Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1603, 1604 (1991); James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the
Impact of Federal Anti-discrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of
South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 138, 139 (1989); James J. Heckman & J. Hoult
Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination Law: An Economic
Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 276,290-97 (1990).
34. See Heckman & Verkerke, supra note 33, at 288-91; see also John J. Donohue III
& James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1715-
22 (1991) (noting the difficulties of assessing the law's impact in light of changing social
mores); J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2089-97 (1992)
(reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) and offering empirical evidence in defense
of Title VII's impact).
35. This is a story that has been previously addressed. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff &
Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's
Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 781-87 (1997); Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse
Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2154,2156-59 (1994).
36. For a discussion of the ADA as requiring affirmative accommodation rather than
simply preventing discrimination, see Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough:
The ADA's "Major Life Activity" Definition of Disability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 173-74
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subjugation command is that similarly situated persons should be
treated similarly. 7 The ADA's reasonable accommodation standard,
however, starts this unique statutory inquiry with the claim that
differently situated persons should be treated differently." Whether
both sets of claims can coexist under the same anti-discrimination
rubric is, we shall propose, at the heart of the current interpretive
controversies surrounding the ADA.39
Moreover, the ADA marks a further departure from even the
extended discussions about the use of facially-neutral criteria. In
challenges to standardized admissions tests in higher education, for
example, a common critique is to question the ability of the selection
mechanism to accurately measure either ability or likely
performance.' Yet the basic accommodation claim under the ADA
accepts the propriety of the employer's ability to measure
productivity while simultaneously arguing that there is an intervening
duty to alter the work environment,41 even if a disabled employee
(1999) ("Although the ADA purports to be an anti-discrimination statute, many of its
provisions specifically require that employers, landlords, and other public entities treat
some disabled people differently from able-bodied people, not equally with them.").
Thus, an employer failing to conform to this affirmative command is not discriminating
per se, but rather, failing to properly redistribute according to the ADA's mandate. See
Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The "Unfair
Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 952 (2000) ("To
achieve equal opportunity for some disabled individuals, the ADA's anti-discrimination
provisions must go beyond a simple mandate preventing discriminatory decisions by the
employer (i.e., beyond corrective justice) to remove unnecessary employment barriers
(i.e., to a redistributive approach).").
37. Professor Mashaw focuses on this feature of ADA claims to show how objective
measures of differential treatment fail to carry the same weight in the ADA context as in
other anti-discrimination claims: "That [the disabled claimants'] employment and wage
rates are lower would seem to represent not discrimination, but the merit selection
generally thought necessary in a competitive economy." Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First
Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 211,219 (1994); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors,
207 F.3d 945, 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The ADA's main target is an employer's rational
consideration of disabilities .... The ADA goes beyond the anti-discrimination principle
.... "), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3003 (June 26,2000).
38. This approach dovetails with Mark Kelman's distinction between what he terms
"simple discrimination" and "reasonable accommodation" in an examination of the public
accommodation side of the ADA. KELMAN, supra note 22, at 2-7.
39. See infra pp. 338-39.
40. E.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 969-80 (1996) (questioning the validity of
standardized tests in predicting academic success). For a defense of limited affirmative
action that accepts the premise that admissions criteria are not unsound, see Samuel
Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669,674-75 (1998).
41. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 949 ("Title I of the ADA, by contrast, requires
employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the process extends beyond
the anti-discrimination principle.").
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may never be as productive as a non-disabled potential employee.
Thus, the claim, at least in part, is not that employers are enslaved to
irrational preconceptions, but that even if the preconceptions reflect
actual productivity, there is an independent duty to accommodate a
disabled candidate.42
Whereas definitions based on race, sex, or age are in the broad
run of cases self-defining, the definition of a disability for purposes of
employment is inherently problematic.43  The statute defines
"disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment."'  Each of these terms leaves open
critical definitional questions and the interpretive guidelines issued by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) do little
beyond redefining the terms at even greater levels of abstraction.45
Not only have these threshold definitional questions consumed ADA
litigation,46 but they seem deliberately aimed at foreclosing the
emergence of a predictable regulatory regime. As expressed by the
EEOC, "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially
42. This argument is forcefully advanced in the context of claims of educational
accommodation for learning disabled students. MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER,
JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH
LEARNING DISABILITIES 218-21 (1997).
43. Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 584
(1998) ("While class membership is essentially assumed under other anti-discrimination
schemes such as Title VII, one must actually establish class membership to sue under the
ADA.").
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
45. The EEOC guidelines define "physical or mental impairment" to include "[a]ny
physiological disorder.. . affecting one or more of nine broad ... body systems" or "[a]ny
mental or psychological disorder." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2000). In turn, such a
disability would "substantially limit" a major life activity if the individual is:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1). That determination in turn requires an analysis of "(i) The
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2).
46. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621,
623-26 (1999) (describing the "rash of litigation over who has a disability"); Harris, supra
note 43, at 576-77.
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limited in a major life activity must be made on a case-by-case
basis."47
The difficulty of defining the scope of the class and activities
protected by the statute is compounded by a similar ambiguity in
defining the scope of the employer's corresponding obligation. The
difficult issues in any system of redistribution or costly
accommodation arise from determining the proper parties to bear the
cost burden and the proper level of cost that must be borne. In other
anti-discrimination contexts, however, the cost burdens are to greater
or lesser extents constrained by the underlying equality norm.' In
other words, the costs imposed result from the failure to treat like
candidates for employment in like fashion. The ADA eschews this
formal equality command by directing that the finding of a disability
affecting a major life activity triggers a duty of reasonable
accommodation.49
The use of the formal discrimination model allowed Congress to
disclaim the clear cost consequences of the burden of accommodation
it shifted onto employers5 The "unfunded mandate" quality of the
47. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 410 (2000) (noting that "neither the
regulations adopted to implement the ADA, nor the Rehabilitation Act regulations on
which they are based, provide meaningful assistance in making the vague 'disability'
definition concrete"). The same insight can be pushed back further into the definitions of
disability for purposes of Social Security benefits. See Lance Liebman, The Definition of
Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of
Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 853 (1976).
48. This is true because most anti-discrimination statutes do not impose on employers
an affirmative obligation beyond non-discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975) (stating that the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination and make whole the victims of such discrimination); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (holding that the purpose of a constitutional remedy is to "restore
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct").
49. We recognize that the line between the anti-discrimination command and the
accommodation mandate is not hermetically sealed. For instance, Professor Jolls
provocatively argues that the logic of disparate impact law compels a redeployment of
resources in much the same way as does the duty to accommodate manifest differences.
Jolls, supra note 11, at 7-47. While such overlap may occur at the extreme margin of Title
VII law, we nonetheless believe that there is a significant departure between an anti-
discrimination mandate that assumes at its core that distinctions based on irrelevant
characteristics should be prohibited, and one that at its core assumes that relevant
distinctions should be accommodated.
50. This point was made from the time of the ADA's adoption in 1991. For example,
academics immediately noted that "the ADA employs potentially unfair taxation to
provide in-kind benefits, which a deficit-happy Congress does not want to fund through
the budget process." Jerry L. Mashaw, In Search of the Disabled, in DIsABILrrY AND
WORK 70 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (agreeing with Carolyn L. Weaver's analysis that
this is one of the "serious concerns" raised by the ADA).
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obligation was magnified by the undefined scope of the ensuing
responsibility to accommodate.5 2 The problem with the statute is that
once a person is deemed disabled, the parties then must litigate at
substantial cost the issues of reasonable accommodation, 3 business
necessity,54 and qualification standards.55
Again, this issue was clearly known at the time the ADA was
adopted because the problem of uncertainty in the reasonable
accommodation standard predated the 1991 ADA. In Gardner v.
Morris,5 6 for example, the Eight Circuit had to determine the
accommodation owed under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act to
an employee of the Army Corps of Engineers.5 7 The employee in
question sought a transfer to a construction project in Saudi Arabia
despite having a manic depressive disorder that required him to
submit to periodic blood tests. The distance between the construction
site and available medical clinics made the installation of an on-site
physician and laboratory at the construction site the only way to
51. The claim that the ADA represents an unfunded mandate emerges from the lack
of any funding for the stated ambition that "the Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals." Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994). As forcefully expressed by
Richard Epstein:
Under the ADA, Congress mandates a set of off-budget subsidies not explicitly
taken into account in setting federal policy. The expenditures are borne by
private firms and by state and local governments, which are left to scramble for
resources as best they can. By working through the regulatory mode Congress
ensures the fatal separation of the right to order changes from the duty to pay for
them.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 493 (1992).
52. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 8-14 ("The exact scope of [the duty of
reasonable accommodation] remains the great unsettled question under the ADA."); see
also Lisa A. Lavelle, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small
Businesses?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1135, 1171-74 (1991) ("Although Congress
provided definitions of 'reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship,' those
definitions are broad and require further interpretation."); Lance Liebman, Too Much
Information: Predictions of Employee Disease and the Fringe Benefit System, 1988 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 57, 81 (recognizing the undefined scope of the duty to accommodate and
arguing that "[w]e must ... bring ourselves to quantify or otherwise bound what we mean
by reasonable accommodation").
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994).
54. Id.; see also id. § 12112(b)(6) (1994) (defining discrimination to include the use of
selection criteria that effectively excludes disabled individuals unless "consistent with
business necessity").
55. Id. § 12113(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (2000).
56. 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. Id. At 1277-78.
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safely accommodate the employee. The court held, presumably
properly, that the accommodation sought was beyond what any
employer could be compelled to provide. But, in rather typical
fashion,5 8 the opinion resolved only that particular case after the fact,
rather than through any principled limitation on the duty to
accommodate.59  There is little in Gardner, as in other pre-ADA
cases, that gives broader guidance on the limits of the duty to
accommodate beyond the facts of the case.
Congress intended courts to use this case-by-case approach, as
evidenced by the plain language and the legislative history of the
ADA. For example, the statute expressly defines reasonable
accommodation to include:
[J]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignments to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.6°
The legislative history further confirms that Congress intended this
language to be as illustrative as the "other similar accommodations"
formulation would indicate.61  This case-specific approach is also
reflected in the ADA's safe harbor provision, which allows employers
58. See Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 n.16 (1999) (holding that under the
ADA "the 'undue hardship' inquiry requires ... a 'case-by-case analysis' ") (quoting 28
C.F.R § 42.511(c) (1998)); Robert L. Strayer, II, Current Issues Regarding the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Asserting the Seventh Amendment: An Argument for the Right to a
Jury Trial When Only Back Pay Is Sought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52
VAND. L. REV. 795, 796 n.5 (1999) ("Whether an accommodation creates an undue
hardship on an employer such that the employer need not make the reasonable
accommodation is a case-by-case determination.").
59. Gardner, 752 F.2d at 1284 ("We emphasize the narrowness of this decision. We
do not condone paternalism toward handicapped individuals.... [But] Gardner's illness
could not have been reasonably and safely accommodated in [Saudi Arabia] in 1977 and
1978.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b) (1994).
61. The Senate noted that its list of illustrations was "not meant to be exhaustive;
rather it is intended to provide general guidance about the nature of the obligation ....
[T]he decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one which must be
determined based on the particular facts of the individual case." S. REP. No. 101-116, at
31 (1990) (Sup. Does. No. Y1.1/8:101-4.85/pt.3). In fact, this passage expressly adopts the
history of the prior disability acts as its model: "This fact-specific case-by-case approach to
providing reasonable accommodations is generally consistent with interpretations of this
phrase under sections 501, 502, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." Id.
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to claim that an unreasonable accommodation "would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." 62
Accordingly, the Court approached the ADA trilogy with a
statute that risks inviting an open-ended judicial revisitation of every
employment decision affecting any employee claiming to be
disabled.63 The professed anti-discrimination norm of the statute
conflicted squarely with its redistributive nature. Absent an equal
treatment baseline that is at least arguably present in other
employment discrimination statutes, the ADA delivers both
regulated employers and overseeing courts into an unfocused and
unprincipled examination of both the nature of disability and the
corresponding duty of accommodation without any guiding principles.
II. MAJOR LIFE ACTIVITIES VERSUS REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION: THE ADA TRILOGY
If, as we have set out thus far, the ADA delivers courts into a
regulatory environment bereft of clear markers for regulating
potentially costly market activity, then the Supreme Court's recent
ADA trilogy may be viewed as just the latest effort in the Court's
ongoing attempt to define defensible and administrable boundaries
for disability accommodation claims. Under this view, the Court's
decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines,' Murphy v. United Parcel
Service,6' and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg6 are best understood as
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994); see also id. § 12111(10)(B) (defining undue
hardship). This defense is no less fact-specific than any other provision of the ADA. The
statute identifies numerous factors to be weighed, including "the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed," "the overall financial resources of the facility," and "the overall
financial resources of the covered entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iii). The
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the Act to allow anything beyond
a de minimus cost to constitute a defense. Indeed, the House Report expressly disavows a
Title VII case allowing a cost defense to a claim of religious accommodation. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 463 (Sup. Does.
No. Yl.1/8:101-4851pt.3) (expressly rejecting TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)). On
the limitations of cost defenses under the ADA, see Lawrence P. Postol & David D.
Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans With Disabilities Act: From Job
Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 712-18
(1991); Sue Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: Allocating the Costs of
Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969, 1986-88
(1993).
63. This is a variant of the Court's concern in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 347
(1976), that the public employment due process cases would leave the federal courts as the
functional equivalents of labor practices tribunals.
64. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
65. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
66. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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an attempt to create a gatekeeping mechanism within an inherently
ambiguous legislative standard.6 7 Further, the rather arcane points of
departure between the majority and dissents in these cases may
similarly be cast as disagreements concerning the capacity to develop
administrable standards for the Act.
The structure of the Act provides the Court with two major
avenues to direct judicial oversight of ADA claims. First, the Court
could impose threshold filters on which employees are covered by the
Act, either through the definitions of "disability" or "major life
activities." If, as we read the recent trilogy of cases, the Court were
to direct its attention to limiting the definition of disability, and
therefore allow this provision of the Act to serve as the gatekeeper to
the "reasonable accommodation" standard, the three critical
definitional questions involve the terms (1) "impairment,"
(2) "regarded as disabled," and (3) "major life activity." Under this
approach, courts would avoid the ensuing envelopment into the
minute factual details of each individual accommodation claim by
raising the barriers to entry into ADA litigation. This is of all the
greater significance if ADA claims are thought to be amenable to
resolution at the summary judgment level. Because the structure of
the Act lends itself to the threshold disability claim being the
plaintiff's burden and the ability to reasonably accommodate being
the defendant's reply,' the debate in the ADA trilogy had major
implications for the judicial administration of ADA claims. 69
67. For a similar view of these categories as providing a gatekeeping function, see
Bagenstos, supra note 47, at 404. Professor Bagenstos, however, takes a far more
expansive view of the ability of courts to administer his understanding of "disability as
subordination," without any particular connection to fault-based behavior on the part of
any particular employer. Id at 445-52.
68. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 117 (1999) ("Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that
they are disabled and that an accommodation is reasonable under the ADA, while
defendants bear the burden of proving that a proposed accommodation creates an undue
hardship."); Deborah Landan Spranger, Comment, Are State Bar Examiners Crazy?: The
Legality of Mental Health Questions on Bar Applications Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 65 U. IN. L. REV. 225, 272 (1996) ("If the plaintiff can make a prima
facia showing that he is otherwise qualified, the public entity bears the ultimate burden of
proving that accommodation of the plaintiff's disability is impossible or unreasonable.").
69. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota Motor Mtg., 110 F.3d 369, 371-74 (6th Cir. 1997)
(interpreting the division between the majority and the dissent over the definition of work
as major life activity as a disagreement over the availability of summary judgment as a
matter of law, or whether claims of disability are matters reserved to the jury).
Nonetheless, courts have disagreed about the burdens of proof in ADA cases. See, e.g.,
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing the
"lenient approach" of the Ninth Circuit and the "more burdensome approaches" of the
District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits while purporting to follow a middle course
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Alternatively, the Court could allow the definition of covered
potential employees to remain flexible and use the employer's
reasonable accommodation obligation to develop standards through
the evolution of case law. In other words, the Act could either be
read restrictively at the first-level definitional stage of covered
employees or, consistent with the legislative history, the Act could be
read to leave the critical definition of disability to case-by-case
assessment. If the Court decided to forego this first method, litigation
pressure would shift to the development of an accommodations case
law that would allow lower courts and, by extension, employers to
anticipate what levels of dislocation and cost are comprised within the
statutory requirement of reasonable accommodation.
A. Defining Disability Under the ADA Trilogy
In these three cases, most notably in Sutton v. United Air Lines,"
the Court attempted to impose gatekeeping functions upon the ADA.
In Sutton, the most expansively reasoned of the three cases, twin
sisters sued United alleging that they had been denied employment
based solely upon their poor eyesight.71 Both sisters applied for a job
as an airline pilot, and United invited both of them for an interview
and a flight simulator test because they met the company's age,
education, experience, and FAA certification requirements. At the
interview, United informed them that it had made a mistake inviting
them to the next round of interviews because the sisters did not meet
the company's minimum vision policy that required 20/100 vision
without the aid of corrective lenses.72
After United refused to hire the sisters, they filed suit, alleging
that United had discriminated against them "on the basis of their
disability" or because United "regarded [them] as having a
disability."'73 The lower courts dismissed their claims because the
sisters could fully correct their visual impairments and thus were not
substantially limited in any major life activity.74 Consequently, they
could not establish a claim that they were disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts,
between the two).
70. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
71. Id. at 476.
72. Both sisters had severe myopia, with an uncorrected visual acuity of 201200 or
worse in their right eyes and 201400 or worse in their left eyes. With the aid of corrective
lenses, however, their vision was 20/20 or better. Id. at 475.
73. Id. at 476.
74. Id.
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holding that the sisters were not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA because they had normal vision with the aid of corrective
lenses.75 In other words, disability should be judged in its corrected
state. The holding did little to resolve the case, however, because
regardless of whether the sisters were actually disabled, United
clearly regarded them as such when denying their employment
applications on the basis of their uncorrected vision. Furthermore,
the Court went on to state that irrespective of United's view of the
sisters' disabilities and the fact that United did not hire them because
of their eyesight, they did not meet the threshold definition of
"disability" because their uncorrected vision did not substantially limit
them in any major life activity.76
The same day the Court decided Sutton, it handed down
decisions in two related cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service7 and
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.8 In Murphy, UPS fired Vaughn
Murphy as a mechanic because he had high blood pressure. Murphy
claimed this violated the ADA because the firing was triggered by his
either being disabled or being regarded as disabled. Unmedicated,
Murphy's blood pressure was an elevated 250/160, though with
medication he could "function normally. ' 79 Murphy's claim revealed
an additional source of complication under the ADA. As an essential
part of Murphy's job, he had to drive commercial motor vehicles,
which in turn required fulfilling federal health requirements imposed
by the Department of Transportation (DOT). One requirement of
the DOT was that a driver of a commercial motor vehicle have "no
current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere
with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely."80 When
Murphy was hired in August 1994, he was erroneously granted
certification even though his blood pressure did not meet the DOT
criteria and, because he had DOT certification, he was allowed to
begin working. The next month, a UPS medical supervisor reviewed
Murphy's file, noticed his high blood pressure, and asked Murphy to
have his blood pressure retested. When the results revealed that his
blood pressure exceeded the maximum DOT level, UPS fired
Murphy because of its "belief that his blood pressure exceeded the
75. Id
76. Id. at 481-89.
77. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
78. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
79. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519 (quoting testimony of Murphy's doctor).
80. Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R § 391.41(b)(6) (1998)).
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DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles.""1
Relying on Sutton's critical definition of major life activity, the
Supreme Court held that Murphy was neither disabled nor regarded
as disabled and therefore affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the
lawsuit.'
Similarly, in Kirkingburg, the Albertson's supermarket chain
fired Hallie Kirkingburg after one year with the company and ten
years of experience as a truck driver 3 because he did not meet the
federal vision standards for commercial truck drivers. The DOT set
the vision requirement at corrected distant visual acuity of at least
20/40 in each eye and distant binocular activity of at least 20/40.84
Kirkingburg suffered from a condition called amblyopia, an
uncorrectable condition that left him with 20/200 vision in his left eye
and monocular vision. When Kirkingburg first applied for a job, a
doctor erroneously certified that he satisfied the DOT criteria, so
Albertson's hired him. A few months later, Kirkingburg received
another physical when he returned to work from a medical leave of
absence that revealed his actual vision. He was informed that, in
order to continue to drive, he would have to obtain a waiver from the
DOT. The DOT had recently begun a program granting DOT
certification to applicants with deficient vision who had three years of
recent accident-free driving. A waiver applicant had to agree to have
his vision checked annually and to report certain information about
his driving record to the Federal Highway Administration. 5
Although Kirkingburg applied for a waiver, Albertson's fired him
because he did not meet the DOT vision standard for his job. Even
after Kirkingburg received the DOT waiver, the company refused to
rehire him. Although Kirkingburg was clearly fired as a result of his
disability, he did not sue under the "regarded as" prong because there
appeared to be no issue that his vision was a physical impairment
within the meaning of the ADA.86 The Court held that despite this
physical impairment, Kirkingburg was not a "qualified" individual
with a disability because he had not passed the DOT regulations.
Relying on statutory incorporation of minimum qualifications," the
81. Id
82. Id. at 521-25.
83. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 558-60.
84. Id. at 558-59 (citing 49 C.F.R § 391.41(b)(10) (1998)).
85. Id. at 560.
86. Id. at 563.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994) (noting that employers can impose qualification
standards on disabled individuals as long as the standards are "job-related and consistent
with business necessity, and ... performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
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Court stated that despite the waiver program, Albertson's was
justified in firing him because he did not meet the DOT standards.
Perhaps showing its frustration with the potential sweep of ADA
claims, the Court virtually abandoned the narrow statutory structure
and interposed a broader policy concern about the statute: "It is
simply not credible that Congress enacted the ADA ... with the
understanding that employers choosing to respect the Government's
sole substantive visual acuity regulation in the face of an experimental
waiver program might be burdened with an obligation to defend the
regulation's application according to its own terms."'  Thus, the
Court upheld the dismissal of the claim on summary judgment.
The first potential gatekeeper of the ADA is the threshold
definition of disability, which effectively triggers the regulatory
functions of the Act. Here, the Court confronted a circuit split on
whether a correctable condition would qualify as a disability or
whether the ADA claimant should be evaluated when her disability
condition was under medical control, as with medical treatment of
high blood pressure. The EEOC and some courts had taken the
position that the threshold determination of whether an individual
suffered from an impairment had to be made based upon the person's
uncorrected condition.9 That is, a person who is nearsighted or who
accommodation").
88. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 577-78.
89. For the EEOC's position prior to the ADA trilogy, see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(j) (1998) ("The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made on a case-by-case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."). A significant number of
cases followed the EEOC Guidelines. E.g., Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156
F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that self-accommodations that mitigate a person's
disability are not to be considered in determining disability status under the ADA); Baert
v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1998) ("We determine whether a
condition constitutes an impairment, and the extent to which the impairment limits an
individual's major life activities, without regard to the availability of mitigating measures
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv. Inc.,
136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Congress intended a reviewing court to evaluate
[disabilities] based on [the] underlying medical condition without considering the
ameliorative effects of... medication."); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.,
136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[D]isabled individuals who control their disability
with medication may still invoke the protections of the ADA."); Doane v. City of Omaha,
115 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Our analysis of whether [a person] is disabled does
not include consideration of mitigating measures."); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102
F.3d 516, 519-23 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that Graves disease uncontrolled by medication
can constitute a disability under the ADA). The Fifth Circuit followed the EEOC
Guidelines with regard to serious impairments only. See Washington v. HCA Health
Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that "only serious
impairments and ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC Guidelines
and the legislative history-diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments-will be
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suffers from some controllable medical condition would be
considered disabled if that person would not be able to perform a
major life activity within normal ranges were the corrective device not
available."
Writing for the Court in Sutton, Justice O'Connor rejected the
EEOC view of the threshold issue by concluding that the severe
myopia of the Sutton plaintiffs could not satisfy the statutory
definition of disabled for three separate, if perhaps unavailing,
reasons. In the first instance, relying on the grammatical structure of
the Act, the Court reasoned that because the definition of disability-
"substantially limits a major life activit[y]"-is in the present
indicative verb form, Congress sought to require ADA claimants to
be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability."9  The fact that a
disability is under medical control or subject to temporary correction
does not necessarily compel the conclusion that it no longer exists
"presently," however. Moreover, to the extent that this exercise in
sentence diagramming was intended to ferret out legislative purpose,
it is certainly possible that even as the phrase is structured, Congress
intended "substantially limits" to include all disabilities, including
those that are amenable to correction.
Second, the Sutton Court said that the ADA requires that each
disability inquiry be individualized. 91 Here the Court construed this
requirement to preclude a definition turning on an uncorrected
condition on the theory that if a person were to be judged in an
uncorrected state, it would undermine the statutorily-required,
person-by-person analysis. Nothing in the determination of disability
suggests that judging people based upon their uncorrected states
would affect this individualized inquiry, however. Just because some
cases might require a generalization of what the world would look
like in an uncorrected state does not mean that it is impossible ever to
determine whether a person is disabled in an unmitigated state. In
the Sutton case, for example, the Court had ample individual-specific
considered in their unmitigated state"), vacated by HCA Health Servs. v. Washington, 527
U.S. 1032 (1999).
90. See Harris, supra note 43, at 581; see also H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d at 519-
23 (holding that the plaintiff's unmitigated disease constituted a disability); Sicard v. City
of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1430 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs'
impaired vision was a disability because "[c]learly, [plaintiffs'] uncorrected vision
substantially limits the major life activity of working"), rev'd and remanded for entry of
judgment, 221 F.3d 1343 (8th Cir. 2000).
91. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
92. Id. at 483.
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evidence of the exact unmitigated vision of the plaintiffs-20/200.
Thus, the Court's conclusion that an examination of the unmitigated
condition precludes individual-specific inquiries ignores the actual,
individualized evidence in the case before it. Whatever the policy
reasons for which the Court needed to reach the conclusion that
uncorrected vision is not a disability, nothing in the nature of an
individualized inquiry compels that result.
Third, and according to the Court, "critically," Sutton relied on a
congressional finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities."93 The problem is that the Court
itself acknowledged that nobody knows exactly what the 43 million
number includes or even where came it from.94 The number itself was
a rough estimate, which appears unsupported in the introductory line
of the text, as a preamble to the Act itself. Most importantly, it is
possible that the 43 million includes the plaintiffs in Sutton and in
Murphy.95 The Sutton pilots had a form of severe myopia, striking
only two percent of the population.96  Murphy, the driver with
93. Id. at 484 (citing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)
(1994)).
94. Id. at 484-86.
95. The origin of the 43 million figure is unclear. If their myopia counts as legal
blindness, the plaintiffs in Sutton and Murphy would probably be encompassed in the
statutorily-intended definition.
96. Id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting J. ROBERTS, BINOCULAR VISUAL
ACUITY OF ADULTS, 1960-1962, at 3 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Stats., Dep't of Health &
Welfare, Series 11, No. 30, 1968).
The majority traces the history of the 43 million figure to a study reported "in an
article authored by the drafter of the original ADA bill introduced in Congress in 1988."
Id. at 484. That article reported that the source of the 36 million figure appearing in the
1988 version of the bill was a report by the National Council on the Handicapped. See
Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 434-35 n.117
(1991). The Court then looked to an updated report issued by the Council stating that
37.3 million Americans had a disability, and made up the difference between that number
and 43 million by inferring that Congress included certain groups of persons in its estimate
that were excluded from the Council's report. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486. The Court did not,
however, justify this inference with any legislative history. Furthermore, as the dissent
pointed out, even if the 43 million figure is taken as an accurate estimation of the class
Congress meant to protect, the majority's approach to defining "disabled" specifically
excludes a group of persons that make up that number. Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Controllable impairments such as severe hypertension and diabetes were included as
disabilities in both the Act's Committee Reports and the studies the Court relies on as the
source of the 43 million figure. Id at 512 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 6 (1986) (including
"hypertensive disease" in a list of "types of disability"); Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA
to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1113
(1999) (reporting that "none of the Court's cited sources employed a definition exactly
like the 'disability' definition appearing in the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA" and "the
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hypertension, also might fit into the category of disabled under the
legislative history of the Act depending on the severity of his
hypertension.
This last attempt to craft a statutory definition of disabled to fit
some rather oddly selected number is itself a peculiar connect-the-
dots approach to statutory interpretation. But, unfortunately, once
the problem of narrowing the definition of disability to preclude an
inquiry into a claimant's uncorrected condition is tackled, it turns out
to do little work. In any case in which the condition of a plaintiff is
put before a court as a reason for the denial of an employment
opportunity, the question whether the condition is in fact a disability
becomes irrelevant. The Act's prohibitions are triggered not only by
the fact of having a disabling impairment, but by the employer's
regarding a potential employee as having such an impairment. As
soon as an employer denies a benefit based on a potential employee's
condition, the issue of whether that condition is actually within the
statutory definition of impairment is irrelevant. The employer, by
denying employment on that basis, has brought the condition within
the protections of the ADA.
Consequently, the second potential gatekeeper, the "regarded as
disabled" prong, provides little protection from potential ADA
liability for an employer who is imposing a job requirement such as
the eyesight requirement in Sutton. After all, regardless of whether
the person is actually disabled, the employer is treating her as if she
were disabled, except under the undeveloped pronouncement in
Kirkingburg. Indeed, seemingly by definition, a person who was fired
because of a disability who was not actually disabled would a fortiori
fit under the "regarded as disabled" category. Under this reasoning,
the definitional prongs of disability cannot serve as effective
protections against an ADA claim going to trial when the employer
has actually refused to hire an individual on the basis of a
characteristic deemed essential to successful job performance.
Rather, the use of a defined personal characteristic, whether actually
an impairment or simply regarded as such, shifts the statutory inquiry
to the capacity of the employer to reasonably accommodate that
impairment.
number of covered individuals is likely to fall far below the forty-three million figure
because it will exclude some people who, according to the documents from which the
figure supposedly derived, were specifically included among the forty-three million
reported individuals").
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B. Is Working a Major Life Activity?
The Court evaded the dilemma of the open-ended quality of the
"regarded as" and "disability" prongs of the ADA by going back to
the remaining component of the statutory definition of being
disabled. Following the lead of several lower courts,97 the Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase "substantially limits a major life
activity" to mean that plaintiffs must allege that "they are unable to
work in a broad class of jobs."98  The Court in Sutton openly
entertained the rather astonishing possibility that working might not
satisfy the statutory definition of "major life activities."9 Without
resolving whether employment would ever be considered a major life
activity, the Court clearly held that the statutory definition of "major
life activity" can never be satisfied by an inquiry that considers only
the job for which the plaintiff actually applied:
To be substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, then, one must be precluded from more than one
type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If
jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her
unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a
broad range of jobs."°
Thus, if plaintiffs, such as the Suttons or Murphy, allege only that
they cannot work in a particular job, then their claims will not survive.
Consequently, the Court held that, "[b]ecause the position of global
airline pilot is a single job, this allegation does not support the claim
that [the employer] regards [the plaintiffs] as having a substantially
limiting impairment."'01
The Court's interpretation is a curious formulation for an
employment discrimination statute for at least two reasons. First, it
essentially presumes the fungibility of jobs, a strikingly odd
presumption in the context of a statutory scheme designed to end
97. See, e.g., McKay v. Toyota, 110 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (addressing carpal
tunnel syndrome); McKenzie v. EAP Mgmt. Corp., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375-76 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (relating to a steel rod in a limb); Kidwell v. Shawnee County, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1201,
1219-20 (D. Kan. 1998) (concerning breathing difficulties around smoke); Schluter v.
Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp 1437, 1447 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (concerning poor vision).
98. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
99. Id. at 492.
100. Id.
101. I& at 493.
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occupational segregation.1°2 What the Court ignores in this analysis is
that all jobs are not created equal. ADA plaintiffs do not seek the
ability to join the workforce generally, but aim to enforce a vision of
the statute that places them in the same positions as their non-
disabled counterparts. Thus, under the Court's analysis, black truck
drivers in the 1960s would not have been substantially limited if they
could work as intra-city deliverymen, regardless of whether they were
not allowed to drive long-haul routes. The reason why discrimination
was deemed invidious in early discrimination claims, such as the
denial of long-haul routes to black truck drivers, was precisely the
very tangible differences in occupational opportunity within the same
general field of work: the consequences of discrimination were
directly observed in the fact that long-haul routes paid better and
conferred more benefits than daily delivery routes. While the truck-
driving situation exemplifies pure "but for" discrimination, it
illustrates the difficulty in the Court's reasoning. Just because a
person can get a low-paying, nonunionized job as a flight instructor
instead of a high-paying, unionized job as a global airline pilot, or a
low-paying, nonunionized job as an intra-city delivery driver instead
of a high-paying, unionized job as a long-haul truck driver, does not
mean that there is no consequence to the selection mechanism that
substantially affects a major life activity. Although well-established
Title VII law would undoubtedly say that the black truck driver's job
prospects are substantially limited, the Court refused to say the same
for the sight-impaired airline pilot.
Second, the Court's definition, if accepted at face value, would
virtually deny the capacity of any plaintiff to prevail under the ADA.
No employer ever makes a determination that an employee is unfit
for service in any part of the industry. At most, the employer will
conclude that an applicant's impairment may render her incapable of
working in that particular position. The Court even implies that such
a job limitation would be valid even if all employers began to use that
same job requirement. °3 In other words, if the regional airlines or the
flight instruction schools fail to hire the Sutton twins because of their
eyesight, they still might not be substantially limited in a major life
activity because if any employer had the sight regulation, it would be
a valid restriction.
The introduction of a more muscular statutory inquiry into the
ability of an applicant to work at a "broad range of jobs" results from
102. Diller, supra note 30, at 25.
103. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
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the Court's decision to settle on the third potential gatekeeper to
stem the tide of ADA suits: the definition of "major life activity."
The Court strongly hinted that this approach could be expanded to
preclude working from serving as a "major life activity" under any
circumstances. 1°4 After all, if working is not a major life activity, then
anyone with a disability that only affects his job will not be classified
as disabled under the statute.105
Nor was this the Court's first encounter with the "major life
activity" prong of the ADA. Most notably, in Bragdon v. Abbot,106
the Court delved into a bizarre inquiry about whether a dental
patient, denied in-clinic treatment because of her HIV status, was
capable of procreation and transmitting the virus to her children. In
construing the public accommodation provisions of the ADA, the
Court had to find a corresponding failure to accommodate on the
basis of a disability affecting a major life activity. The issue in
Bragdon had little to do with this inquiry. Rather, the Act would
appear to condemn the failure to treat the HIV-positive individual as
she desired only if the decision were medically unfounded or based
on prejudicial animus. But, in order to trigger statutory inquiry, the
Court had to find that the plaintiff was disabled in a major life
activity, to wit procreation, even though this had nothing to do with
her visit to the dentist."° The Court felt compelled to develop this
line of inquiry because if no major life activity was limited, a person
104. While the Sutton Court assumed for the sake of argument that working is a major
life activity, it implied that had the issue been squarely presented, it would have decided
that working is not a major life activity. I& In support of its contention, the Court cited a
1986 Transcript of a Supreme Court Oral Argument in which Solicitor General Charles
Fried introduced the idea that defining work to be a major life activity in the disability
rights area might be circular. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1986) (No. 85-1277) (argument of Solicitor
General)). The Court then cited EEOC regulations for the proposition that even the
EEOC is reluctant to define "major life activities" to include work. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1999)). This evidence fails to support the conclusion reached
because the guidelines the Court used are also clear that working is a major life activity.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (2000) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any
other major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is
substantially limited in working." (emphasis added)).
105. The difficulty of reading employment out of life's major activities is revealed by
comparison to some other forms of activity that have been held to be covered by the
accommodations provisions of disability protection laws. See, e.g., Calloway v. Glassboro
Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that being questioned in a
police station is covered).
106. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
107. For an extended look into the Bragdon opinion that develops the convoluted
nature of its reasoning, see KELMAN, supra note 22, at 32-38; Harris, supra note 43, at
604-07.
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could not be disabled under the statute. Thus, if the plaintiff in
Bragdon had undergone a tubal ligation, whether or not known to the
dentist, the public accommodations provision of the ADA
presumably would not have been triggered. Consequently, the Court
bizarrely construed the ADA to ensure that a person with HIV is
classified as disabled for purposes of a visit to the dentist-something
that could not possibly be affected by whether a person is able to
procreate. Bragdon might well be explained by an underlying
concern that the dentist's refusal to provide in-office treatment could
be occasioned by animus, prejudice, or unjustified fear. But the
doctrinal inquiry that follows is curiously unconnected to the issues
involved in a routine visit to the dentist.
Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg are merely extensions of the
Court's reasoning in Bragdon. As in Bragdon, the Court in the most
recent trilogy hunted for an illogical animus that shadowed the case.
Unlike Bragdon, the Court found that no irrational motive or fear
drove the employers in any of the three more recent cases. Instead,
employers were responding to a rational weighing of the costs versus
the benefits. Indeed, although they were private parties, the
employers were in reality sitting as judges for the costs to society as
well. Some of the employers' decision not to hire the Suttons,
Murphy, or Kirkingburg can be explained as a desire to avoid the
increased risk of a potentially disastrous occurrence, like a plane or
car crash. Even if the risk is virtually de minimus, it is greater than
the risk of having a pilot who can see without corrective lenses or a
driver who has actually passed DOT regulations. 08 The employer
internalizes the costs to society by making a judgment that even the
small risk of potentially devastating litigation and tort claims is not
worth the benefit of employing these people. Yet the Sutton Court,
as in Bragdon, cannot acknowledge that this fundamental, animus
versus redistribution point underlies the outcome. Instead, the Court
engaged in some statutory legerdemain in order to fit the square peg
of disability-definition into the round hole of cost-benefit analysis.
The Court strained the wording of all three prongs of the statute
so much because the definition of disability is the ballgame. Once an
employee or potential employee overcomes the initial hurdle of being
classified as disabled, the lawsuit moves to an inherently ambiguous
and time-consuming search for the specific facts in each case. This
almost inevitably results in an inquiry into the employer's claim that
the disability could not be reasonably accommodated or that such
108. See Bagenstos, supra note 47, at 515.
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accommodation would impose equally uncertain "undue burdens."'"
So, the Court ended up with odd reasoning. For instance, despite the
fact that the ADA is an employment statute and Americans spend
very substantial parts of their lives working, the Court was reluctant
even to view work as a major life activity. But if work is not a major
life activity, what else is a major life activity? ° We know from
Bragdon that procreation is a major life activity. But it would be
extremely peculiar for Congress to have brought disability status
within the rubric of employment discrimination law if working were
not intended to satisfy the threshold statutory definition. The Court
does not even take the most basic step of holding that working is a
major life activity because it is concerned that the doors of the courts
will open too wide. On this reading, this risk was not present in
defining procreation as a major life activity in Bragdon because the
ADA will rarely be implicated in procreation; rather, the Act is
aimed at employment.
C. The Reasonable Accommodation Alternative
The interpretive weaknesses in the ADA trilogy did not escape
unnoticed by the dissents. The main dissent in Sutton, written by
Justice Stevens, pointed out that while "Congress certainly did not
intend to require United Air Lines to hire unsafe or unqualified
pilots," the ADA mandates that courts treat individuals such as the
Sutton sisters as disabled."' The dissent first noted that the majority's
reliance on the 43 million figure in the Act's preamble could not
109. Diller, supra note 30, at 25.
110. Perhaps we can look to the census form. The long version of the 2000 census asks
two questions which might hint at a major life activity as well as a substantial limitation:
16. Does this person have any of the following long-lasting conditions:
a. Blindness, deafness, or a severe vision or hearing impairment?
b. A condition that substantially limits one of more basic physical
activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying?
17. Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting 6 months or
more, does this person have any difficulty in doing any of the following activities:
a. Learning, remembering, or concentrating?
b. Dressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home?
c. Going outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor's office?
d. Working at a job or business?
United States Census 2000, Form D-61B (informational copy available at
http://www.census.gov/pub/dmdlwww/pdfld-61b.pdf) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Of course, if we use these definitions, the Suttons, Murphy, and Kirkingburg
would probably have established, at the very least, that they were disabled or regarded as
disabled with regard to a major life activity, and accordingly would have survived
summary judgment.
111. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,495 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reasonably be treated as dispositive of Congress's intent." It then
gave the example of a war veteran who lost his limb yet wears a
prosthetic device, and argued that if an employer refuses to hire that
individual on the basis of his prosthesis, the "employer has
unquestionably discriminated against the individual" even if the
injury "in no way affects his ability to do the job.""' Justice Stevens
then read into the second prong of the definition of disability,
covering cured ailments, support for the proposition that courts
should only inquire whether a present or past impairment
"substantially limits, or did so limit, the individual before
amelioration.""' 4 In other words, the determination of disability is to
be judged without regard to corrective devices, a point with
substantial support in the Act's legislative history. Thus, the Act's
primary legislative exposition, the Senate Report, clearly announced
that the disability determination is to be decided "without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures. '
The dissent's next move is the most interesting, however. Justice
Stevens argued that even if a person is classified as disabled, she will
not prevail in her discrimination claim unless she can show that the
employer took action because of the impairment and that the
employer is able to provide her with reasonable accommodation." 6
Thus, the dissent would open the courts to hear the claim of disability
on the merits, without fear of an unstoppable surge of such claims:
"Inside that door lies nothing more than basic protection from
irrational and unjustified discrimination because of a characteristic
112. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96
(discussing the majority's reliance on this figure).
113. Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Ia (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)). The
Report further states that the goal of the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition
was "to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that
therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated against on the
basis of their medical conditions. For example, individuals with controlled diabetes or
epilepsy are often denied jobs for which they are qualified." Id. at 500 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 28 (1989)). The dissent also cited a House
report clarifying a part of the Senate's bill: "The impairment should be assessed without
considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable
accommodations, would result in less-than-substantial limitation." Id (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1990)). For good measure,
Justice Stevens tossed in parallel EEOC regulations as further proof that disability is
decided without regard to mitigating measures. Id at 501-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (1998)).
116. IaM at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that is beyond a person's control.""1 7 Thus, Justice Stevens wrote that
"it seems to me eminently within the purpose and policy of the ADA
to require employers who make hiring and firing decisions based on
individuals' uncorrected vision to clarify why having, for example,
20/100 uncorrected vision or better is a valid job requirement."'18" In
other words, the dissent would shift the burden of proof, thereby
requiring employers to litigate job requirements to prove that they
are necessary to job performance rather than a pretext for
discrimination.
Having cast the ADA into the familiar burden-shifting inquiry of
Title VII," 9 the dissent took the majority to task for its strained
reading of the statute. 2° It chastised the majority for construing the
Act in a way "that will obviously deprive many of Congress' intended
beneficiaries of the legal protection it affords."'' In addition, it asked
why the Court should not treat the definition of disability to include
uncorrected vision in as much as the employer regards the plaintiffs
as unqualified because "they cannot see well without glasses."'" The
dissent concluded by denigrating the Court's reliance on the 43
million figure as the basis for its decision, calling it a" 'thin reed upon
which to base' a statutory construction.""1D Indeed, the dissent noted
117. Id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 506-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981)
(laying out the basic burden-shifting standard under Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining that once a complaint establishes a prima
facie case of racial discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to justify not
hiring the potential employee for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason). Some courts, as
well as commentators, have noted the difficulty of applying the McDonnell Douglas
standard to ADA cases. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 527 (2d ed. 1998) (noting cases). For a more recent application of the
burden-shifting standard to ADA cases, see Harris, supra note 43, at 586-94.
120. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.
249,260 (1994)); Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas
to Employment Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans With Disabilities Act,
79 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1533 (1995) ("[I]t is inaccurate to assume courts should apply Title
VII's burden of proof allocations to ADA cases simply because they both deal with
employment discrimination."); Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation
Difference: The Effect of Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed Under
Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases to Claims Brought Under Title I of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 160 (1997) (arguing that the
McDonnell Douglas standards is appropriate only in ADA cases in which the employer
claims that the employment action was unrelated to the plaintiff's disability).
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that the majority's construction of the Act would deny protection to
many of the "core group" of 43 million."2
Despite the familiar form of a debate over statutory construction,
the dispute between the majority and the dissent goes beyond the
niceties of statutory interpretation and involves a complicated
assessment of policy and judicial administration of the ADA. The
real point of separation comes with the issue of what should serve as
the gatekeeper for access to the courts under the ADA. Whereas the
majority saw no alternative but to halt the inquiry with an elevated
plaintiff's burden, the dissent asked, in effect, why the same sort of
case-by-case development could not emerge on the employer's
burden of reasonable accommodation. The dissent explicitly asserted
that an expanded definition of disability will not cause any increase in
the filing of "baseless or vexatious lawsuits."'2 Even if it would,
Justice Stevens wrote, the "anxiety" of "requiring employers to
answer in litigation for every employment practice that draws
distinctions based on physical attributes ... should be addressed not
in this case, but in one that presents an issue regarding employers'
affirmative defenses."'26
The dissent's attempt to craft its own judicially manageable
standards turned on the ability to define "reasonable
accommodation" in a fashion that would give courts substantive
guidance. Oddly, the Court's ability to decide Kirkingburg on the
basis of reasonable accommodation shows just how difficult the
definition of the employer's obligation might be. Recall that the
plaintiff in Kirkingburg had an uncorrected vision of 20/200 in his left
eye, as well as de facto monocular vision, while the DOT expressly
required visual acuity to be at least 20/40 in each eye and distant
binocular activity to be at least 20/40. The plaintiff unequivocally
failed to meet the DOT guideline and was discharged accordingly.
The Court was able to fashion a bright-line rule that a deviation from
the "[g]overnment's sole substantive visual acuity regulation" is per
se evidence that the employer was not under a further duty to
reasonably accommodate the employee. 7
But what of cases lacking the clear signposts of Kirkingburg?
Absent some unequivocal, governmentally-imposed rule defining job
qualifications, courts will have no choice but to delve into the factual
124. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,577-78 (1999).
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minutia of each individual case. Indeed, the Court's opinion,
unanimous on this point, stated that it "is crucial ... that Albertson's
here was not insisting upon a job qualification merely of its own
devising, subject to possible questions about genuine appropriateness
and justifiable application to an individual for whom some
accommodation may be reasonable."" Instead, the Court could look
objectively to the government's own job qualification standard, which
by law was binding on Albertson's.' 29 This pre-existing bright-line
standard allowed the Court unanimously to reach the "reasonable
accommodation" question as each Justice knew that courts could
resolve such cases with ease. 3'
By contrast to Kirkingburg, the Court could not resolve the same
issue of DOT certification in Murphy because a factual question
remained about whether the petitioner actually met the certification
requirements.3 1  The lesson from Kirkingburg is that unless the
record is unequivocal about both the nature of the employer's
obligation and the facts giving rise to that obligation, concerns over
judicial administrability of the ensuing claims will force the analysis
into the definition of "disability" itself rather than the "reasonable
accommodation" standard. One way to read the majority in the
ADA trilogy is that the Court will only permit limited forays into the
definition of "reasonable accommodation" when both the facts and
the law are so clear that the case is in principle susceptible to
summary judgment review.
Conversely, allowing cases to proceed to the reasonable
accommodation inquiry pushes inexorably toward the fact-intensive
case-by-case analysis. Theoretically, the Court could take an
approach that looked at average productivity levels within a given
workforce and compared how much the hiring of the disabled worker
128. Id- at 570.
129. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R § 391.11 (1998)).
130. See id.
131. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516, 522 (1999). One might ask
why the court did not apply the same reasoning to Murphy, as the plaintiff in Murphy was
also violating a DOT regulation made binding upon the employer. The simple, pragmatic
answer is that the Court did not grant certiorari on the reasonable accommodation
question; rather, it took the case to resolve the definition of disability itself. Indeed, the
Court in Murphy hinted that had the issue been directly raised, the Court might have
decided the case on the Kirkingburg standard, where failure to comply with a neutral
government regulation gives an employer a per se affirmative defense against the
reasonable accommodation claim. See id. at 522-23 (concluding that the Court need not
resolve the issues neither addressed by the lower court nor raised in the petition for
certiorari, such as whether the employer had a defense based on DOT regulations).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would affect that productivity. 32 It could even devise a rule similar to
the one in Hazelwood School District v. United States,133 such that a
plaintiff can come close to proving per se discrimination by showing
that the productivity loss would be less than two or three times the
standard deviation from the employer's mean output per employee.Y
The difficulty in drawing analogies to prior uses of statistical
presumptions in discrimination cases is precisely the problem
identified at the beginning of this Article. Unlike the normal
operation of anti-discrimination laws, the ADA does not begin with
the presumption that but for some forbidden discrimination, there
would be no disparity in the treatment of statutorily protected groups.
In addressing other discrimination cases, the Court was able to
fashion a presumption of discrimination based on statistical evidence
in Hazelwood and other Title VII cases 35 because the type of
discrimination at issue in those cases was amenable to proof that
presumptively equivalent groups were treated disparately. The Court
could compare the percentage of black teachers hired with the
percentage of qualified black teachers in the area because " 'it is
ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will
in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired.' ,,136 This "but for" discrimination
rationale simply does not translate to the ADA cases. The ADA
does not readily lend itself to a simple statistical model that assumes
that but for prohibited considerations, there should be a strong
presumption of statistical convergence between the treatment of
132. The legislative history of the ADA disfavors one version of this approach. In
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), for example, the Court
interpreted the reasonable accommodation standard of Title VII's protection of religious
groups to preclude liability if the cost of accommodation was more than trivial. Id at 84.
Congress expressly disavowed this case law precedent. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra
note 21, at 5-14.
133. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
134. Id. at 308-09 n.14 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977)). In
Hazelwood, the Court allowed a class of plaintiffs to introduce statistical evidence showing
that the school district had hired black teachers at a percentage substantially lower than
the number of qualified teachers in the area. The facts revealed that 1.8% of the teachers
were black, compared to 5.7% qualified black teachers in the area. Because the actual
number of black teachers and the expected number of black teachers varied by more than
"two or three standard deviations," the Court allowed the plaintiffs to use this evidence as
"prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." 433 U.S. at 307-08 & n.14.
135. See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Castaneda, 430
U.S. at 482.
136. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307 (quoting Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340
n.20).
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different groups. Because the ADA's reasonable accommodation
standard assumes differently situated employees by virtue of a
statutorily encompassed disability, there is no reason to expect any
convergence in productivity and, in fact, every reason to presume the
contrary.
Furthermore, the Court has cautioned on numerous occasions
that the ADA mandates that each claim be treated on a case-by-case
basis.137 This emphasis in turn requires an individualized inquiry into
the abilities of a particular employer and the actual demands of a
specific job. The Court had an easier time using statistical evidence in
cases like Hazelwood and International Brotherhood of Teamsters13
because the claims at issue involved class-wide litigation, instead of
individual claims.13 9  Indeed, the Court in Hazelwood cautioned
against using statistical evidence in the type of cases always at issue in
the ADA: "When special qualifications are required to fill particular
jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the
smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications)
may have little probative value.'
140
Certainly, the task of judicial interpretation commonly requires
the filling out of vague textual terms. But in almost every other case,
the Court is either interpreting the Constitution or is receiving at least
some modicum of guidance from Congress. The Constitution is by
definition open-textured, and certainly the Court has the right, if not
the duty, to fill in these terms as a constitutional common law or as a
sub-constitutional regulatory regime.41  While the Court must
interpret congressional intent regularly, it at least receives guidance
from the text, the legislative history, or an agency. As we shall
develop in the last section of this Article, what is striking about the
137. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,484 (1999).
138. Int'l Bd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337-40.
139. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308.
140. Id at 308 n.13.
141. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 passim (1975) (arguing that
constitutional interpretation relies upon "constitutional common law"); Melissa Saunders,
Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603
passim (2000) (arguing that the Shaw v. Reno line of cases is best understood as the Court
imposing a sub-constitutional regulatory regime in order to achieve the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
This view is far from unanimous. Its most famous critic, Justice Scalia, has
commented that the idea "that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the
Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful 'prophylactic' restrictions
upon Congress and the States" would give rise to "an immense and frightening
antidemocratic power ... [which] does not exist." Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct.
2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ADA is the extent to which the Act leaves courts in the role of
legislating so extensively in Congress's stead.
Moreover, the reasonable accommodation test forces the courts
into the uncomfortable role of weighing public safety into the
balance. After all, the perils of having a pilot unable to see because a
contact lens pops out during landing or a hypertensive mechanic who
crashes his truck on the way to a repair take the added expense of
"reasonable accommodation" outside of the normal employment
productivity calculus. All the more so in a case such as Kirkingburg
in which federal regulatory authorities have already mandated certain
vision requirements for the position in question. But even when
federal regulations do not cover the exact issue, how should courts
answer the question whether United Air Lines should have to place
another co-pilot in each cockpit for every pilot whose vision is worse
than 20/100? If not, is it worth the added risk, even if it is extremely
slight, that the pilot will be marginally disabled during the flight and
thus dramatically increase the chances of a catastrophic accident? 142
If a pilot is hypertensive, should United be forced to place a doctor in
the cockpit in order to give life-sustaining CPR in the case of a heart
attack? All of these examples might seem ludicrous: Of course the
employer should not have to hire an extra pilot, or place a doctor in
each cockpit. The problem is, however, that even these absurd claims
must have their day in court to test whether the employer's failure to
accommodate was "reasonable" or whether it imposed "an undue
burden," if the ADA is read to include the Suttons or Murphy within
the definition of disabled.
III. COURTS IN THE REGULATORY ABYSS
We now turn our attention to the features of the ADA that
differentiate it from other employment discrimination statutes, such
as Title VII. Our focus is primarily on the cost burdens of the ADA
and, in particular, on the lack of risk-spreading among similarly
situated employers that is a distinct feature of the statutory
reasonable accommodation standard. Under the employment
provisions of the ADA, the issue of who bears the burden of paying
142. Lest this scenario seem too far-fetched, at least one crash in recent history has
been blamed on a faulty contact lens worn by the pilot, and at least one other crash was
nearly averted after a pilot's contact lens popped out of his eye during the landing
approach. See Matthew L. Wald, The Crash of Egyptair 990: The Case Histories, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1999, at A12 (documenting a 1996 crash that occurred because a pilot was
wearing the wrong type of contact lens).
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for necessary accommodation is primarily decided by the rather
arbitrary procedure of which person happens to apply for
employment to a particular employer or which employee contracts a
sudden illness or suffers a tragic accident. This Part first examines
proposals that attempt to overcome this lack of risk distribution and
explains why these ideas ultimately do not work in the context of the
ADA. The problem of risk distribution is compounded by the fact
that Congress has not funded the costs imposed by the ADA, which
in effect taxes some employers sub silentio while leaving other
employers in the same market less affected by the regulatory regime.
We then suggest other places to look, particularly the German
equivalent of the ADA, for ways to spread the costs more evenly
across employers.
We attempt to show that significant drawbacks to the
employment provisions of the ADA exist beyond the apparent lack of
fit between its invocation of the anti-discrimination norm and its
redistributive core. By focusing on the cost feature of the statute, we
raise the additional concern about the statutory mechanism by which
a class of affected employers can bear the costs equitably, as opposed
to one particular employer shouldering society's burden and thereby
placing it at a relative disadvantage to all other employers.
A. A Social Insurance Model of Accommodation
At this point, the reader experienced in the ways of incomplete
regulation may rightly wonder whether the ADA is really so clearly
deficient. It may well be that the ADA fits poorly in the framework
of employment discrimination law, but does that truly set it apart
from the less than perfect world of regulation? Is the ADA that
different from the less than clear commands of the Clean Air Act 43 or
the Endangered Species Act'" or the judicially-crafted rule of reason
in antitrust law? 145 Nor can it be that unusual that a well-intentioned
statute not bear a full accounting of its potential costs. Certainly a
large number of statutes, from the Black Lung Act146 to the
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
145. The "rule of reason" doctrine states that the Sherman Act does not prohibit all
restraints on trade but only those that are "unreasonable." See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
146. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
Environmental Policy Act,147 fail to account for the full range of costs
imposed under their commands' 48
Indeed, some authors, notably Professors Karlan and
Rutherglen, have even compared the case-by-case process of forming
the law of reasonable accommodation under the ADA to the
incremental process of creating the law of negligence under tort
law.149 Karlan and Rutherglen acknowledge the similarity of Title VII
and the ADA, even noting that "[t]he central prohibitions of the
ADA are all taken, directly or indirectly, from Title VII,' '5 with the
notable exception of the problematic reasonable accommodation
standard. They have observed that the ADA creates a dilemma by
mandating that an employer have the burden of proof whenever the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that she is disabled and that
reasonable accommodation is possible.'' Once an employee passes
this initial hurdle, summary judgment becomes exceedingly difficult
for the employer. Given the case-by-case analysis that Congress
mandates"2 and the difficulty of a party with the ultimate burden of
proof at trial establishing the absence of a disputed "genuine issue of
material fact,"'53 there is the risk that the prima facie case alone could
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
148. See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994). The Black Lung
Act sets up a scheme whereby the states, the federal government, and private employers
bear some responsibility for payment. Indeed, the Act specifically contemplates that each
operator of a coal mine shall secure the payment of benefits." 30 U.S.C. § 933(a).
Although the amount is proscribed by law, the full range of costs is unknown because the
total number of beneficiaries is also unknown. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994) (requiring
environmental impact statements before implementation of federal action, even if they
create significant delays or additional costs).
149. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 31-32.
150. Id. at 5.
151. See id. at 12-13.
152. See id. at 12-13 & n.49.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The ability to shift the intermediate burden of production at
summary judgment is present only when the party seeking summary judgment does not
bear the ultimate proof at trial on that issue. Once the employer is charged with
disproving the possibility of reasonable accommodation, the employer becomes the party
with the ultimate burden of proof on that issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323-27 (1986) (establishing intermediate burden shifting at summary judgment); Samuel
Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100
YALE L.J. 73, 73-82 (1990) (setting forth the availability of summary judgment after
Celotex only for the party without the ultimate burden of proof on that issue). There is
some evidence that employers prevail a surprising amount of the time, despite the
allocation of burdens under the ADA. For example, one study by Professor Colker
reports defendants winning an astonishing ninety-three percent of ADA cases. See Ruth
Colker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Windfall For Defendants, 34 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999). This unbelievably high win rate would be completely at
odds with the continued filing of cases by lawyers seeking to be compensated only if they
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force a defendant to trial, no matter how unreasonable the claim for
accommodation might appear.
Nevertheless, Karlan and Rutherglen propose a normative
justification by casting the ADA into the model of an implicit
insurance arrangement." To do so, they posit a world of individuals
in an original positiofa in which their particular attributes could not be
known at the time the social policy had to be created. By asking what
the world would look like behind such a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,
Karlan and Rutherglen can posit that because people would have no
way of knowing whether they would become disabled, everyone
would want some form of accommodation for the possibility of having
a disability. 55 Consequently, they argue, the ADA could properly be
seen as a form of workplace insurance against the common risk that
anyone could have been the individual suffering a disabling
misfortune. 56
prevail. Indeed, such a win rate over virtually the entire history of the ADA should have
dissuaded the filing of any ADA claims, something that clearly has not happened. These
data are culled from Professor Colker's review of reported and unreported cases at the
district and appellate level from 1992-1998 that are available on Westlaw. Id at 103. As
she readily acknowledges, there are difficult methodological issues in extrapolating to the
complete domain of litigation that occurs in the small subset of cases prompting judicial
opinions that are in turn available through electronic services. Id. at 104. Although the
article argues, correctly, that reported decisions serve as the benchmark from which
parties may subsequently bargain in the shadow of the law, the data set is nonetheless too
sparse to sustain the claim that the entire class of ADA plaintiffs has not fared well
through litigation under the Act. Thus, the study reports only 615 cases during the entire
six-year period-a figure that is not remotely comprehensive for the entire six years. Even
assuming the study to be representative-as opposed to comprehensive-Colker reports
that less than 40% of these 615 cases were resolved through summary judgment, an
astonishingly low figure given the prevalence of employers' judgments. More critically,
the data set does not account for cases that settled favorably following a denial of
summary judgment, an event that is generally unlikely to produce a written opinion but
that would dramatically alter the bargaining dynamic heavily in the plaintiff's favor. See
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra at 102-03 (providing a model of why the denial of
summary judgment improves the bargaining position of the surviving plaintiff). In light of
the ADA's insistence that cases are to be decided on an individualized basis, there is
reason to speculate that courts may routinely deny summary judgment in ADA cases
without opinions. Moreover, the part of the win rate for defendants may be the result of
plaintiffs' attorneys, whose experience is likely to be drawn from other fields of civil rights,
having difficulty with the more open-textured quality of ADA claims. See Jeffrey A. Van
Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing
Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to
Professor Colker, 19 REv. LrrIG. 505, 574-78 (2000) (providing qualitative assessments of
the types of errors leading to plaintiffs' losses in reported ADA decisions).
154. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 26-28.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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While the Karlan and Rutherglen insurance model presents a
useful starting point for analysis, ultimately it does not completely
capture the true nature of the employer's liability under the ADA.
Under a veil of ignorance, not only is it impossible to know whether
one will actually be disabled, it is also impossible to guess whether
any particular person will bear the primary burden of paying for this
insurance. In other words, their model answers only half of the
question. An insurance scheme not only must avoid the adverse
selection problem, it also must have the capacity to smooth the risk
pool over the entire class. While Karlan and Rutherglen neatly
capture the first part, they barely address the lack of risk-spreading in
the ADA. In any insurance program, the insurer must be able to
spread its risk across a sufficient number of people to reduce the
potential that chance alone will cause costs and liabilities to soar
dramatically.157
It is the lack of risk-spreading that distinguishes the ADA from a
true insurance pooling arrangement. The ADA's accommodation
standards are triggered first by the fact that a potential employee
selected one employer rather than another to apply to for a job.
Thus, any individual employer may be subject to costs of unknown
dimensions158 while her competitors are not. In turn, the extent of the
157. Karlan and Rutherglen anticipate this point, but they do not develop it
adequately. They suggest that perhaps the government should take a more prominent role
in granting reasonable accommodations because it has the ability to spread costs more
widely. See id. at 28-29. They leave unanswered the question of whether the current
ADA adequately addresses the risk-spreading problem.
158. It is frequently stated that the costs of accommodations are trivially low in the
ADA employment context. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE
CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 51 n.14 (2000). The source cited for
this proposition is invariably data contained in Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1619-20 (1996). Were the potential financial
scope of such ADA accommodations truly so limited, one might wonder what all the
shouting is about. Further examination, however, reveals that these data actually establish
very little. The source for the data contained in the Harvard Law Review Development is
a report to Congress on the Job Accommodation Network (JAN), which supplies
information regarding specific accommodations to callers requesting help in complying
with the ADA. See generally Job Accommodation Network, JAN Publications and Other
Guidances, at http://jan.wvu.edulenglishlpubs/index.htm (last modified May 8, 2000) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (listing available publications and providing
state-by-state reports of calls). JAN then gathers data about the cost of accommodation
by sending questionnaires to those who call and relying on them to return the
questionnaires with information regarding whether or not they in fact made the suggested
accommodation, and if they did, how much it cost. It is questionable whether the results
of such a process could estimate the actual cost of accommodation. By relying on the
caller to return the questionnaire, the report's statistics exclude those employers who did
not wish to alert a government agency of its failure to make an accommodation, perhaps
because the accommodation was too costly. Furthermore, the sample does not include
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accommodation standard is defined not by a uniform obligation
across all employers, but by the ability of any employer to pay,
regardless of fault or ensuing competitive disadvantage. 159  By
contrast, a true insurance model would tax employers either on a
standard scale, or perhaps on some experience-rated scale, and then
pay off the ensuing costs out of the insurance pool. The key to a
genuine insurance view of employer costs is that costs either become
an across-the-board feature of doing business for all employers (as
with the minimum wage) or they provide some other mechanism to
pool risk (as with unemployment insurance). 1 °
Another member of the emerging Virginia school of statutory
remediation, 6' Professor Verkerke, tries to fill in the gap left by
Karlan and Rutherglen 62 Professor Verkerke argues that the ADA
could properly be viewed as equitably spreading risk if, instead of
imposing costs on all employers, it directed disabled employees to
those employers who were best able to accommodate them in a cost-
effective fashion. 63 This approach to the ADA might not fully
resolve the inter-employer equity problem, but it would claim great
social utility because it would efficiently allocate the societal costs of
those employers who choose not to call in the first place because, while they do not know
exactly how to make an accommodation, they know or suspect the cost would be high. It
seems reasonable to infer that a large number of employers who call such a service already
feel the accommodation would be cost-beneficial and are simply seeking information on
how to best follow through. Thus, these self-selected data cannot bear the evidentiary
burden placed on them.
159. This point is insightfully addressed by Professor Kelman, who questions whether
this feature of the ADA may come closest to an unconstitutional exaction or taking:
[D]oes the statement in the ADA that every public accommodation owner owes
disabled customers reasonable accommodation state an implicit tax liability that
is general enough, or does the fact that the dollar amount of the liability will turn
on particular facts about the owner's business and the nature of the required
accommodation make such a regulatory tax suspect?
KELMAN, supra note 158, at 68.
160. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 35, at 2216 ("The premise of
unemployment insurance is that employees should be protected against the vagaries of
market cycles, but that employers should be able to pool risk so as not to suffer the
compound effects of a market slowdown and increased exposure to claims of laid off
workers.").
161. We note that, at the time of publication, Professors Karlan, Rutherglen, and
Verkerke were all members of the Virginia School of Law faculty. We believe that it is a
tribute to that school's scholarly tradition that three of its faculty should be grappling with
the difficult issues of justifying the costs of the ADA.
162. See J. HOULT VERKERKE, AN ECONOMIC DEFENSE OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION LAW passim (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 99-14), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.tafabstract_id=170014 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
163. See icL at 26.
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accommodation. If Professor Verkerke is right, there would be a
strong normative justification for the regulatory processes of the
ADA as achieving a maximum of accommodation by the cheapest
cost providers of that accommodation. Unfortunately, this argument
also has a fundamental shortcoming: Nothing in the ADA, its case
law, or its regulations explains how the ADA will provide for the
most effective accommodation.
The ADA specifies that once an employee qualifies as disabled,
the employer has the duty to accommodate unless such
accommodation proves unduly burdensome.' 6" That inquiry, in turn,
is not a comparative one that would allow proof that another
employer exists that could provide accommodation at a lesser price,
at least not under the current positive case law of the ADA. Under
the reasoning of the Court in Sutton, for example, an employee would
not even be classified as disabled in the first instance if she could
transition into any other job within a broad category of
employment." But even if we carve out the recent ADA trilogy, it is
still not clear what the mechanism is that avoids a liability
determination until the least costly accommodator is found. Not only
does Professor Verkerke admit that there is no tie-in to the case law
at present,'66 but it is also unclear what legal standards he would like
to see emerge. Certainly no other area of employment discrimination
law has evolved a defense to discrimination on the basis of a rival firm
being a cheaper alternative for an unwanted employee.
Professor Verkerke's argument also might create perverse
incentives for employers to fight all forms of accommodation for their
current employees. Under current law, many cases that make it past
the first hurdle of proving a disability and the potential for reasonable
accommodation settle because of the uncertain nature of both
recovery for monetary damages and injunctive relief.6 7
Consequently, many employees and employers accept a compromise
when the employer makes some form of minimal accommodation in
exchange for the employee returning to the job and dropping the
lawsuit." s Professor Verkerke's plan would discourage even this
minimal amount of accommodation because once an employer made
some type of accommodation, that employer would become a magnet
for other disabled employees. Under a comparative accommodation
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
165. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
166. See VERKERKE, supra note 162, at 26.
167. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 19-20.
168. See id.
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approach, even a marginal difference in accommodation would
permit other employers to use the first employer as evidence that
someone else could better accommodate the disabled employee.
Thus, more disabled employees would "match"'69 with employers
who already accommodated either through settlement or coercion, or
simply because the employer thought it was the right thing to do.
Employers might shy away from making any affirmative or voluntary
steps toward accommodation if they thought that it would require
them to employ a heavier concentration of disabled workers with
attendant higher costs. Indeed, the workplaces that would best match
disabled workers might be those workplaces that happened through
chance to accommodate first, thus not resolving the fundamental
point about the ADA's lack of risk pooling. 7°
B. The Costs of Redistribution
This uneven distribution of risk, without any subsidy from
Congress, sets the ADA apart from other statutes. The difference is
not simply the imperfection of a regulatory structure, nor is it the fact
that the legislature has not internalized the costs. Rather, it is that
the Act has both these facets while at the same time imposing costs
that are not smoothly distributed across the market and across all
employers. There are those who argue that all legislation must
internalize the full costs of compliance, precisely to avoid the
potential for legislative irresponsibility that arises whenever
"unfunded mandates" permit avoiding the hard questions of
allocating scarce social resources.' While the unfunded mandates
169. See VERKERKE, supra note 162, at 26.
170. This argument has more force when comparing employers within a given class of
jobs, rather than between classes of jobs. Even between classes of jobs, Verkerke's plan
would in effect relegate a group of disabled workers who otherwise might have been able
to work at a higher-paying or higher-prestige job to a job that is lower on society's rungs.
171. As articulated by Justice Scalia:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth
transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it
permits them to be achieved "off-budget," with relative invisibility and thus
relative immunity from normal democratic processes .... Subsidies for these
groups may well be a good idea, but because of the operation of the Takings
Clause our governmental system has required them to be applied, in general,
through the process of taxing and spending, where both economic effects and
competing priorities are more evident.
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted). For an economic argument that tax and spend
provisions transfer wealth more efficiently than regulations, see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 passim (1994).
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charge is troubling, we do not in any sense want to argue that
Congress may never impose costs that are not fully supported by a tax
and transfer mechanism. Indeed, sound normative and legal reasons,
including federalism and economic efficiency, support a policy of not
mandating that Congress fully fund all programs it authorizes. 72
There are innumerable contexts in which the significant
administrative costs of governmental programs would make a direct
tax and transfer program unnecessarily expensive. 3 For example, it
would be extremely difficult and expensive for an administrative body
to determine the true cost of compliance with health and safety
protections across a diverse set of workplaces. It would also be
tremendously burdensome (if not outright impossible) for such a
regulatory body to acquire accurate information about the hazards in
any particular workplace. Forcing the state to pay for all protective
health and safety measures would not only burden such employee
protection programs, but would invite fraud and waste by employers
who have no incentive to weigh the true costs and benefits of any
particular remedial effort.174
On the other hand, the fact that perfectly valid reasons may exist
for not requiring all federal legislation to be financed by tax-and-
transfer schemes does not end the inquiry. The issue of the inter-
employer distribution of costs under the ADA harkens back to the
debates at the founding of the modem regulatory state concerning the
proper distribution of the cost of providing social benefits. Indeed, it
is useful to revisit the debate prompted by Justice Sutherland in his
opinions holding the minimum wage to be unconstitutional and later
172. For a critique of the federalism issues involved in unfunded regulations, see
Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1137, 1143 (1997) (challenging the "assumption that unfunded federal mandates are
presumptively 'bad' rather than legitimate policy choices"); David A. Dana, The Case for
Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 36 (1995) (arguing that
unfunded mandates are the most efficient means to achieve some federal objectives); Julie
A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 351, 382 (1999) (arguing that unfunded mandates can produce long-term efficiency
gains over funded mandates).
173. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1523 (1997) (noting that, in the context of pension plans, "a
general tax and transfer program, may be expensive ... and inefficient"); Anthony J.
Vlatas, An Economic Analysis of Implied Warranties of Fitness in Commercial Leases, 94
COLUM. L. Rv. 658, 686 n.148 (1994) (noting that, in the area of welfare law, "the cost to
administer a tax and transfer system... may make such a system inefficient from a wealth-
maximization perspective").
174. The problems with imposing a uniform model of full governmental subsidy for all
regulatory costs are addressed in KELMAN, supra note 158, at 76-78 (discussing perverse
disincentives for firms to address problems more efficiently).
[Vol. 79
2001] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA TION AND THE ADA 349
in his dissents from the early cases upholding the New Deal.75 Justice
Sutherland argued that the imposition of a minimum wage was invalid
in part because of the arbitrary imposition of duties on parties unable
to shoulder the cost. Sutherland wrote that the minimum wage
"amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the
support of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests
upon him no peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect,
arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a burden which, if it belongs to
anybody, belongs to society as a whole." 76 Sutherland asked what
would happen if a family who relied on the grocer or the baker as
their regular source of provisions lost its ability to support itself.
Would the grocer have a duty to provide groceries for a reduced sum,
or even for free? If so, for how long and to how many people?' 7" To
Justice Sutherland, the minimum wage was unconstitutional precisely
because the statute required in effect that the grocer offer goods at a
free or reduced price.
The rejoinder to Justice Sutherland focused on the actual burden
on an employer occasioned by the minimum wage. 78 Contrary to the
assertion that the minimum wage was a random and non-
dischargeable obligation that struck an employer as unpredictably as
the fate of the greengrocer having to provide for a family suddenly
175. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400-13 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923), overruled by West Coast
Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
176. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 409 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 410-11 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Sutherland wrote that:
"Should a statute undertake to vest in a commission power to determine the
quantity of food necessary for individual support, and require the shopkeeper, if
he sell to the individual at all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed
maximum, it would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy of
any argument in support of the validity of such a statute would be quickly
exposed. The argument in support of that now being considered is equally
fallacious, though the weakness of it may not be so plain. A statute requiring an
employer to pay in money, to pay at prescribed and regular intervals, to pay the
value of the services rendered, even to pay with fair relation to the extent of the
benefit obtained from the service, would be understandable. But a statute which
prescribes payment without regard to any of these things and solely with relation
to circumstances apart from the contract of employment, the business affected by
it and the work done under it, is so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary
exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of the
United States."
Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting Adkins, 261 U.S. at 559).
178. See id. at 396-97 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that the actual burden on the
employer is low because those who will be paid the minimum wage "will not be employed
at even the lowest wages allowed unless they earn them, or unless the employer's business
can sustain the burden" (quoting Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570)).
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facing unemployment, the key feature of the minimum wage was not
only that its attendant costs could be passed through to any particular
employer's customers, but that it had the same effect across the class
of all employers. The higher cost of labor imposed by the minimum
wage became the cost of doing business and it was imposed on all
employers such that none would be at a relative disadvantage. By
contrast, any one particular grocer would be at a competitive
disadvantage if he had to cover the subsidy to the unemployed family,
as his rivals would not have to raise their prices unless they were also
subsidizing the unemployed.79 Indeed, Chief Justice Taft, writing for
the dissent in Adkins and who would later be vindicated when the
Supreme Court upheld the minimum wage in West Coast Hotels v.
Parrish,80 cited the fact that the minimum wage covered all
employers as a reason for sustaining its validity. 8 1
So, where does the ADA fit in? Is it more like the minimum
wage in its ability to spread costs over all employers, as well as in its
ability to force the employer to pass on the higher wages in the
market prices for all goods and services? Or is it more like the
arbitrary imposition of a duty upon Sutherland's grocer, one that very
well may put the unfortunate cost bearers out of business?'82
Although the Karlan and Rutherglen model assumes the former, the
evidence is not convincing. The nature of the ADA-requiring
individualized determinations of each disability-strongly implies that
in many instances, the employer is like the lone grocer. The higher
cost is not spread to all employers, but rather to the ones who
unluckily employ a person who later becomes incapacitated or who
hire a disabled person in the first instanceY.3 The odd quality of the
179. A grocer might rationally decide to offer reduced prices to long-standing
customers or to anyone in the hope that he will reap long-term rewards in the form of
community goodwill and loyalty. This rationale is, of course, different than a mandated
individual subsidy because the grocer himself is making a rational economic decision
balancing the short-term loss with the possibility of a long-term gain.
180. 300 U.S. 379,400 (1937).
181. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 566 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) ("The cases covered restrictions
in wide and varying fields of employment and in the later cases it will be found that the
objection to the particular law was based, not on the ground that it had general
application, but because it left out some employments.").
182. Justice Sutherland noted in Adkins that:
It ignores the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than
a certain sum, not only whether the employee is capable of earning it, but
irrespective of the ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving
him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an alternative for
going on at a loss.
Id. at 557.
183. Cf. Browne v. CNN Am., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 1768 (JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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ADA is that risk is not pooled through the broad market, but through
the random act of a prospective employee applying for a job, a
feature that is only somewhat offset by the requirement that the
employer have at least fifteen employees to fall under the statute's
mandates." 4  By itself, however, that lone number is not a fully
satisfactory definition of an ability to avoid adverse selection or
arbitrary bad luck. A workplace with fifteen employees does not
command a sufficient market presence to pass off the cost to
consumers or have a presumptive surplus from other employees.
Moreover, the ADA is fundamentally different from other
statutes such as the Sherman Act,l "5 the Clean Air Act,'8 6 and the
Endangered Species Act.'1 In almost all other statutes in which
Congress uses vague terms, it does so within the overall aim of the
statute itself. For example, courts know that poorly defined words in
environmental regulation statutes still fit under the general goal of
improving the environment, even if their cost-benefit contours are
hazy. Indeed, in almost all of these statutes, Congress and the
implementing agencies have expressly acknowledged the wealth-
redistributive aspect of the statute. The fundamental distinction
between these statutes and the ADA is that the latter forces the
inquiry within the poorly-fitted context of a "but for" discrimination
model. With regard to the Sherman Act, for example, courts are able
to confer a meaning on a broad and vaguely-worded statute because
both the courts and Congress have recognized the long common-law
tradition of judicial involvement in this area.'8 If Congress does not
like a decision, it can enact a statute overturning the ruling; both
Congress and the courts work under a shared understanding of the
basic meaning of the terms, even if they might disagree on the result
17699, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1999) (refusing to punish an employer for taking the
risk of hiring a disabled employee in the first instance), affd by No. 99-9494, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25480, at *4-6 (2d Cir. Oct. 6,2000).
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
185. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (outlawing contracts or conspiracies
in restraint of trade but allowing courts to graft common-law traditions onto the statutes,
thus limiting the phrase "every contract").
186. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7701 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (defining in detail such items
as air quality criteria, § 7408, hazardous air pollutants, § 7412, and maximum allowable
increases in pollutants, § 7473).
187. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994) (setting out the policy and defining specifically how
and when to determine the existence of an endangered or threatened species).
188. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 499 (1940) ("[T]he restraint of
trade contemplated by section 1 of the [Sherman] Act took its origin from the common
law, and ... the Sherman Act was adapted to the prevention, in modem conditions, of
conduct or dealing effecting the wrong, at which the common law doctrine was aimed.")
(citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54, 55,58 (1911)).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in any given case. When Congress disagrees with the Court's
interpretation of the Sherman Act under say, a rule of reason
standard, Congress knows exactly how to overrule the Court's
decision.
Yet the resolution is not so clear cut in the ADA cases.
Fundamentally, the ADA is distinct from statutes like the Sherman
Act because the ADA runs counter to the common law, rather than
supplementing it. The history of the courts' involvement in antitrust
law lends itself relatively well to judicially-crafted rules. 89  By
contrast, courts have traditionally been extremely wary of crafting
rulings when it receives so little guidance from Congress in areas that
have a profound effect on private market ordering and wealth
redistribution. The courts' common-law experience with
discrimination statutes is centrally within the realm of "but for"
discrimination. Courts have the competence to decide whether the
government or a private actor is discriminating against a person based
solely upon that person's skin color or sex. Courts tread on more
precarious turf when the "but for" discrimination aspect becomes
secondary to the unstated wealth redistribution goal of the statute.
Even the analogy to tort law development is fundamentally
distinct from the ADA. In tort cases, courts are able to balance the
risks versus the benefits' 9 and do so classically, even within the
employment relationship. As Karlan and Rutherglen point out,
"[n]egligence law places the loss on the party, either plaintiff or
defendant, who could have reduced the risk that caused the harm to
the plaintiff at the least cost."' 9' The ADA, by contrast, does not rely
on efficiency per se; rather, it looks to equalize the workforce without
giving substantive guidance or effect to the meaning of terms like
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship.""g
189. See, e.g., supra note 145 (describing the judicially crafted "rule of reason").
190. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Hand, J.). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 147-
51 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining the Hand formula and its application to certain cases).
191. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 32.
192. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.); David Harger, Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act Reducing the Effects of
Ambiguity on Small Businesses, 41 KAN. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (1993) (recognizing the
ambiguity of the statutory definitions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" and proposing more specific definitions of those terms); Lavelle, supra note 52,
at 1138 ("Although Congress provided definitions of 'reasonable accommodation' and
'undue hardship,' those definitions are broad and require further interpretation. The
potentially broad implications of the employer's duty under the ADA worry small
businesses, and the uncertain meaning of the terms provoked some to call this Act a
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The problem with the ADA is a combination of factors yielding a
series of concerns, the first two of which are most apparent, while the
third is potentially the most problematic. First, the statute poorly
confronts its core concern with accommodation by invoking time-
tested anti-discrimination norms. Second, the statute does not
confront the costs that must be borne to meet the redistribution it
impliedly envisions. These two concerns yield some failure of
political accountability for the trade-off in using societal resources for
access as opposed to other goals. While troubling, these concerns are
present in large areas of the regulatory landscape and do not set apart
the ADA. By contrast, the third concern, the failure of the statute to
insure that costs are borne equitably across the class of affected
employers, may be addressed independently.
In deciding who should bear the cost of regulation, our animating
principle is that one particular employer or a small subset of
employers should not be subject to higher costs unless they in some
sense "deserve" to pay a higher price, either because they have not
completely internalized their own costs or because they are in some
sense morally different than those who do not pay the added costs.
These principles derive from well-established norms in the law. That
parties should pay for their wrongdoing when they are morally
culpable is simply the basis of civil liability, including liability in the
employment discrimination area. Similarly, when parties force others
to bear the costs of their behavior, with the classic example being
pollution, a liability regime forces a party to internalize the full costs
that it imposes. In economic terms, such regimes prevent parties
from imposing cost externalities, particularly if the cost bearers are
likely to be a diffuse group with little incentive for any individual to
sue on his or her own behalf. Finally, there may be reasons based on
defensible social policy to tax one but not another group for the cost
of social programs, as most classically found in a use tax on those who
derive the clearest benefit from a government program, as with
national parks. Not all financial burdens imposed by government
need to occur in the taxation context, of course. Indeed, having every
program take place through the tax and spend mechanism can stifle
innovation by disincentivizing private industry from trying to cut
'lawyer's dream.' "); Elizabeth Clark Morin, Note, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189,211 (1990) (noting that
"the nature of the definition of undue hardship will leave employers guessing about
whether they are in compliance") (footnote omitted). See generally Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 21, at 32 (noting that the ADA demands equal opportunity for the disabled).
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costs.193 Yet this fact is not a license for all financial burdens imposed
by government to take place by the more opaque means of
regulation, as opposed to the more politically accountable process of
taxation.
When a regulation imposes a cost on a broad swath of society in
an equitable manner, as with the minimum wage, no special concerns
are raised. Because the minimum wage is imposed on all employers,
the effect is to pass the costs along to the consuming public, in effect a
proxy for a general tax. Since all those in a similarly situated group
have the increased cost, no one employer is relatively worse off than
its direct competitors. And certainly when the regulation merely
ensures that a company or an employer internalizes its own costs, as
in the context of pollution prevention, no special concerns arise.
When, however, a law imposes burdens on a small subclass of people
that disadvantages them relative to similarly-situated parties, our
guard should be raised. While rational reasons might exist for
imposing a set of obligations upon a class of employers, singling out a
particular employer on a completely arbitrary basis is the
paradigmatic example of a lack of a rational basis underlying the law.
It bears emphasis that concern over the burden of redistribution
is not necessarily a condemnation of all regulation that imposes costs.
For example, one may contrast the employment provisions of the
ADA with the public accommodation section of the Act along these
lines. Under Title III of the ADA, owners of commercial
establishments that routinely hold themselves open to public
visitation must make their places of business accessible to the
disabled.194 Clearly, this command is redistributive because the
proprietors of such establishments are also forbidden from passing on
the costs to individual disabled patrons. At the same time, there is a
significant difference. The need for most accommodations under this
provision of the ADA are not triggered by the presence of any
particular disabled patron, but by the fact that a business holds itself
open to the public. Thus, in the case of the most typical
accommodations, ramps or accessible parking or restrooms, the costs
of accommodation are one-time fixed costs that fall on the entire class
of similarly situated proprietors-precisely the argument made in
defense of the minimum wage. While there are incremental costs
associated with special services for particular disabled patrons, these
193. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967);
supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-12183 (1994); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (1999).
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are the rare exceptions. 195 By contrast, on the employment side of the
ADA, such exceptions are the norm. 96 Paradoxically, concerns about
spreading the costs of accommodation more broadly among society as
a whole brings the ADA more closely into conformity with the claims
of disability rights activists, who "insist that society as a whole has a
responsibility to eliminate the social and physical structures that deny
people with 'disabilities' access to opportunities and thereby create
the 'disability.' 197
The German equivalent of the ADA provides another example
of how costs can be spread more evenly. The German Handicapped
Act mandates what might be termed a "pay or play" regime: It
requires all public and private employers with more than fifteen
workers to hire one severely disabled person for every sixteen job
slots or pay a monthly fee of two hundred deutsche marks for each
unfilled quota position. 9 The German law provides as an explicit
goal that 6% of the workforce should be composed of disabled
people. 99 While, by 1990, disabled workers composed only 4.5% of
the targeted workforce, the law's stated goals and tradeoffs allowed
employers, disabled workers, and the electorate to assess openly the
costs, as well as the benefits, associated with employing the severely
disabled.2° Germany set the tradeoff at about two hundred deutsche
marks per month.'
195. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(denying summary judgment to a doctor who argued that providing an interpreter to a
hearing-impaired patient at no additional cost would lead to a loss of money from
providing services).
196. The ADA defines reasonable accommodation by giving specific examples of
accommodations that the legislature perceived to be reasonable. See supra text
accompanying note 60. Most of these examples are incremental, ongoing accommodations
by their very nature.
197. Bagenstos, supra note 47, at 430; see also Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability
Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability
Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1028 (1998) (arguing that the ADA requires
"changes in social norms in order to alter the significance of a medical impairment").
198. Leo J.M. Aarts et al., Convergence: A Comparison of European and United States
Disability Policy, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 299, 319,
327-28 (Terry Thomason et al., eds., 1998) (citing The German Handicapped Act of 1974
(Erstes Gesetz zur Anderung des Schwerbehindertengesetzes (Schwerbehindertengesetz
or SchwbG)).
199. See Mary C. Daly, Who is Protected by the ADA? Evidence from the German
Experience, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: SOCIAL CONTRACT OR
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 101,104 (1997).
200. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the German disability system, see
Richard V. Burkauser & Petri Hirvonen, United States Disability Policy in a Time of
Economic Crisis: A Comparison with Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany,
MILLBANK Q. 166-94 (Supp. 2 1989); Klauss Jacob et al., Germany: The Diversity of
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More fundamentally, the ability to opt out of employing disabled
workers in exchange for paying a fee to the government means that
all employers must contribute toward the admirable societal goal of
full employment of disabled workers.2 2 Moreover, allowing the
tradeoff gives an employer the flexibility to decide, for example,
whether it is worth employing a person who has a history of
hypertension or paying a fee in lieu of employing that person.23
Passing the costs through to all employers, as opposed to those
employers "unlucky" enough to have a disabled worker, permits
some predictability in costs. Furthermore, because everyone must
bear some of the increased costs, the real beneficiaries are the
disabled workers themselves: German workers who are disabled are
much more integrated into the work force than disabled workers in
the United States.2 The penalty that employers must pay goes into a
fund that is divided between two government agencies-the state
welfare offices (Hauptffirsorgestellen) and the federal employment
office (Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit). °0 The federal employment office
uses its share to help employ disabled persons. 06 While the German
system has its flaws as well,2" it addresses what we consider the
Pathways, in TIME FOR RETIREMENT: COMPARATIvE STUDIES OF EARLY EXrr FROM
THE LABOR FORCE (Main Kohli et al. eds., 1991).
201. For other examples of a subsidy and fine system for employment market
discrimination, see Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
133, 144-49 (1994).
202. France also has a system giving quotas for the employment of disabled workers
while allowing workers to opt out of the system. Employers who do not want to abide by
the quota must pay a fine to a fund for the integration of disabled people into the
workplace. See Bernard Gutow, Survey of Rights of Workers With Disabilities:
Comparison of the United States with the European Community, 11 N.Y. INT'L. L. REv.
101, 120-21 (1998). In total, ten members of the European Community have some sort of
quota system, although only France and Germany have the opt-out provision. See id. at
119-21.
203. This system bears some resemblance to Rip Verkerke's model. See Verkerke,
supra note 162, at 23-28.
204. Aarts et al., supra note 198, at 309 tbl. 4 (noting that 58.4% of German disabled
males work full time compared to 45.6% of American disabled males).
205. SchwbG, § 11, abs. 4.
206. Id.; id. § 33, abs. 1, nr. 3. (describing duty of federal office); see also Carol D.
Rasnic, A Comparative Analysis of Federal Statutes for the Disabled Worker in the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United States, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 283, 313-14
(1992) (discussing the German penalties for noncompliance).
207. The major complaint about the German system is not with its conceptual
framework but with the fact that it is simply ineffective in providing sufficient incentives to
employers to hire persons with disabilities. Jerry L. Mashaw describes this inefficiency as
follows: "One third of employers hire no severely disabled workers and 40% of employers
have less than their quota. That means that 73% of German employers are not in
compliance with the quota." Mashaw, supra note 37, at 236. He continues by noting that
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fundamental drawback of the ADA-the lack of an equitable cost-
spreading feature.
The ADA trilogy may be seen as a response to this difficult
regulatory void-in effect an ADA rule of reason. Perhaps the
reason these cases are so problematic is not the substance of the
outcome in terms of whether these particular individuals should be
able to hold positions with evident public safety implications. The
reason why this ADA trilogy seems so troubling is that the Court is
making this judgment sub silentio and without any real guidance from
Congress on this point. In these cases, the result might seem
substantively correct, but what about in other cases where there is
only a marginal increased cost to the employer and no increased risk
to the public at large? Perhaps the Court might take a more
aggressive view in these cases, yet probably it would adhere to the
formula outlined in Sutton because the Court is fearful that they will
open the doors of justice too wide. Perhaps Kirkingburg and
Bragdon combine to focus on the possibility of decisions borne of
pure animus. And perhaps the Court would like to create some type
of rational-basis-with-teeth review. But the question remains
whether the Court's impatience with ADA claims has so far closed
the door on ADA claims as to preclude even the pure animus claims
from going forward.
CONCLUSION
Our goal is to show that behind the odd interpretations in the
latest round of ADA employment cases lies a difficult problem of
judicial administration of a poorly-crafted statute. The seeming
inconsistencies of the recent ADA trilogy stem from the fact that
while the ADA purports to be a statute attacking "but for"
discrimination, it is really a statute inviting an unspecified amount of
redistribution. Although other statutes since Title VII have had to
balance the anti-discrimination command with an implicit
commitment to redistribution, only the ADA finds its primary
statutory concern in the anticipated shift of resources to its intended
beneficiaries. No doubt a wealthy and benevolent society may direct
substantial resources to facilitate the integration of the disabled or
any other disadvantaged group. But while such societal objectives are
entirely noble, there is insufficient political responsibility in passing
the $100 per month German employers must pay for each worker under the quota is
considered by most commentators to be "much too low, and that there would be major
improvements if it were raised by a factor of two to four." Id
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statutes that are only marginally related to their true objectives. The
ADA is not just another anti-discrimination statute, and it was
incumbent on Congress to address how it was to be implemented and
at what cost.
While we hesitate to offer any magic bullet to the problems we
have identified, we note that were Congress to address the cost
implications of the ADA head-on, some legislative progress could be
had. For example, Congress could give more robustness and clarity
to the meanings of reasonable accommodation or undue hardship.
Although it stayed away from setting a percentage cap on the cost
increase that would constitute an undue hardship, °8 Congress could
at least set a prima facie standard, say a ten percent increase, by
which the burden could shift back to the plaintiff to show that the
measure really is a reasonable accommodation. Congress could also
offer more tax incentives to employers who take steps toward
reasonable accommodation.
But no solution resting on present statutory interpretation is
likely to be effective until Congress confronts the disjunction of fitting
a statute with such wealth-redistributive aspects into a context of "but
for," Title VII-like discrimination. Until then, the Court's narrowing
of the definition of "disabled" may prove the easiest and most
effective way for the Court to limit the seemingly unfathomable
potential sweep of ADA claims. By constricting the meaning of
"disability" to such an extent, the Court has blocked at the gate the
vast majority of claims that would otherwise proceed to trial or
settlement. Yet Bragdon indicates that the Court would still leave
enough of a gap to ferret out those cases where the exclusion of the
disabled is simply the product of irrationality, ignorance, or animus.
If so, the ADA would finally begin to resemble a classic employment
discrimination statute. Unfortunately, it is difficult to reconcile this
hope for an anti-discrimination command with the curious
pronouncements on work, career and "major life activities" that
emerged from the ADA employment trilogy.
208. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 21, at 38.
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